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Abstract 
 
The dissertation consists of two essays. In the first essay we study the efficiency of banks during the 
period of (2000-2017) that witnessed a fierce financial crisis in the light of the regulatory acts enacted in 
response to the crisis (Basel III 2010). We investigate the combined impact of compliance with Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 capital, common equity Tier 1, and leverage requirements on bank operating efficiency. We 
measure operational efficiency of 68 insured, U.S. federally and state-chartered, commercial banks, with 
consolidated assets of $15 billion or more, over a sampling period of 18 years. We seek to identify 
whether different dimensions of bank regulation are efficient in stabilizing US financial system by 
improving efficiency of large commercial banks; whether they impede bank efficiency by limiting its risk-
taking endeavors and tightening its capital usage; or whether no impact on efficiency exists altogether. 
We build an empirical model measuring the impact of capital and leverage regulation and credit risk on 
banks’ operational efficiency. Empirical findings show a positive and statistically significant impact of 
capital adequacy on operating efficiency of large U.S. commercial banks, with common equity Tier 1 
having more power in determining efficiency. Leverage requirements and net charge-offs are also found 
to be significant determinants that promote bank operating efficiency. In the second essay we investigate 
determinants for government’s choice of sovereign Sukuk over conventional bonds. Using a sample of 
143 sovereign Sukuk and 602 sovereign conventional bonds issued in 16 OIC countries during (2000-
2015), we analyze factors affecting the government's choice of employing sovereign Sukuk structure as 
substitute to sovereign bonds instruments. Results suggest that countries having developed financial 
markets, higher credit quality, and strong economic and financial prospects are more likely to issue 
sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign bonds, mainly as a strategy to diversify and develop their current 
debt markets by introducing newly-developed debt tools. However, countries with weaker economic and 
financial indicators are more likely to opt for the classic sovereign bonds. We conclude that government’s 
choice of sovereign debt is mainly determined by a country’s financial characteristics, macroeconomic 
indicators and certain specific events.  
 JEL Classification: G2, G180, G1, G21, F3, P4   
 Keywords: Financial Institutions and Services, Financial Crisis, Banks and Depository 
Institutions, Banking Regulation, Financial Markets, International Finance, Islamic Economic 
System, Sovereign Debt Issuance, Emerging Markets
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CHAPTER 1 
 
The Ten Year Anniversary of the Global Financial Crisis: a Look at Financial Regulation 
Impact on the Efficiency of U.S. Commercial Banks 
 
1. Introduction   
  
It is on September 15, 2008 that the fourth-largest investment bank in the U.S., Lehman 
Brothers, filed for the largest bankruptcy protection in U.S. history. Lehman Brothers and other 
major financial institutions in the U.S. were trapped in a subprime mortgage crisis, fueled by 
the 2007-2008 mortgage bubble, where major financial institutions were originating mortgages 
to less credit-worthy borrowers and issuing mortgage-backed securities. This asset-backed 
security issuance strategy soon fired back when borrowers started defaulting on their 
mortgages and the number of foreclosures sky-rocketed at unprecedented rates, giving rise to 
one of the fiercest financial crises that not only swept the U.S. by its feet but also ballooned to be 
dubbed the global financial crisis of 2007-2009.    
Financial crises are known to inflict large and unrelenting social costs, highlighting the 
relevance of banking stability (Thakor, 2014). Commercial banks, the backbone of the financial 
system in the U.S., were in the midst of this heated situation. Through a myriad of financial 
services such as depository, saving, loan initiating, intermediation, treasury management, 
facilitation of payment services, etc., commercial banks sustainability and soundness are crucial 
to the overall prosperity of business and finance within any country.  
As of December 31, 2017, there were 1,827 insured, U.S. chartered commercial banks, 
each with consolidated assets of $300 million or more, adding to total consolidated assets 
amounting to $15.56 trillion compared to 1,739 commercial banks with total consolidated assets 
of $11.03 trillion in December 31, 2009, with close to 300 banks going under between 2009 and 
2010.1        
                                                          
1 We relied on the December 31, 2017 Federal Reserve Statistical Release to obtain the list of banks. 
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The 15 large banks in the U.S. banking system in December 31, 2017, constitute 64% of 
the sector, with a total consolidated asset size of approximately $10 trillion. The large five banks 
alone (J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, Bank of America, Wells Fargo Bank, Citibank, and US Bank) 
control about 47.97% share of the U.S. banking industry with an approximate total of $7.46 
trillion in consolidated assets.2         
In spite of the changing economic climate causing earnings in the banking industry to 
fluctuate, annual revenues for large U.S. banks are projected to rise to nearly $24 trillion by 
2019.3 
The current and near future outlook for the banking sector is promising. The KBW 
Nasdaq Bank Index, a benchmark stock for the banking industry, with 24 banking stocks 
representative of large U.S. national money center banks and regional banks, has been up 23% 
since recent Presidential elections of 2016, with investors expecting the Federal Reserve (Fed) to 
hike interest rates, which will increase the banking sector’s profitability. There have also been 
recent talks that President-elect Donald Trump’s administration is contemplating an ease of 
regulation of the sector.        
For the sake of showcasing how our study came about, we will devote the next section 
to covering banking regulation throughout the main three sub-periods that reshaped not only 
the banking sector in the U.S. but also the whole financial system within the last eighteen years.  
 
Regulation pre-crisis (2000-2006):  
Before the 2007-2009 financial crisis, regulators prioritized certain prudential 
regulations, federal deposit insurance, in addition to the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending 
power, as measures of limiting the risk of commercial bank failures (Sykes, 2018). Performed by 
three U.S. government agencies or federal regulators in the caliber of the Federal Reserve Board, 
the FDIC, and the OCC, bank regulation is conducted at multi-level, i.e. federal and state-level. 
                                                          
2 We relied on the December 31, 2017 Federal Reserve Statistical Release to obtain the list of banks. 
3 We obtained this statistic from statista.com 
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Banks can choose the type of charter they can operate under; which impacts the type of 
regulation they become subject to.     
Prior to the financial crisis, the Congress was warned about suspicious, fraudulent, and 
predatory lending practices many banks were engaged in; and many calls were issued to the 
Federal Reserve to step in and rectify those malpractices. This puts the financial regulation in 
hot waters, since its main role of overseeing and closely monitoring banks and financial 
institutions’ operations fell short and a financial crisis took the U.S by storm.     
In fact, the credit crisis that followed thereafter highlighted the necessity for banks to be 
tightly regulated than before. With banks playing a vital role in the stability of the financial 
market and the economy in general, as well as the welfare of depositors and investors alike, 
strict bank regulation is highly recommended to prevent bank malfeasance and thus protect the 
financial system from unforeseen risks and uncertainties. 
 
Regulation during the crisis (2007-2009): 
 
The recent global financial crisis (2007-2009) was unparalleled in its scope and severity 
in that it wreaked havoc throughout the highly interconnected global financial system, 
instigated an enormous stress for financial markets around the world, and caused asset prices to 
plunge and credit flows to American households and businesses to be disrupted.  
The collapse or near-demise of some of the world's largest financial firms shocked U.S. 
and global economies, leading to steep declines in production levels, and costing millions 
around the world their employments. Although many bank regulations were in effect, bank 
failures in the wake of the 2007-2009 crisis unraveled the vulnerable regulation situation.      
As far as bank failures in the US are concerned, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) reports that 462 banks failed from 2008 to 2012 and had to be closed; as 
opposed to only 29 bank failures prior to the crisis (2000-2006), and 62 banks post crisis (2013-
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2017).6 FDIC administers special insolvency regime where it rapidly resolves failed banks 
outside of the Bankruptcy Code.   
The unprecedented number of failing banks in the midst of the crisis alerted policy 
makers to a steep inadequacy of bank regulation and ill-supervision and soon enough, they 
were in route to designate the catalyst behind the trouble. It is because large financial 
institutions suffered from low and insufficient levels of high-quality capital (HQC), had too few 
high-quality liquid assets (HQLA); and engaged in inadequate risk measurement and 
management systems, banks were getting in deep trouble.    
As a response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, those agencies have taken drastic 
measures in the form of stricter bank supervisory and regulatory pressures to prevent similar 
dire circumstances from reoccurring in the near future. The goal of possible reforms is a clear-
cut one, i.e. to efficiently reduce not only the possibility of future systemic financial crises, but 
also their social and financial costs, boosting economic growth and welfare in the process 
(Claessens & Kodres, 2014).     
As a part of the regulatory effort post-crisis in the US, the Treasury established several 
programs under Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) as of October 2008 as a drastic 
measure to stabilize the U.S. financial system, jump-start economic growth, and rectify some of 
the crisis’ spillovers. Shortly after, a total of $700 billion was authorized for TARP; although it 
was subsequently reduced to only $475 billion by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 (U.S. Department 
of Treasury).  
Regulation post-crisis (2010-present):  
Early in the beginning of 2009, the Federal Reserve initiated the stress test exercise in 
order to determine whether banks have sufficient levels of capital to survive adverse economic 
shocks, while responding to regulatory levels of minimum capital established under stress test 
programs. As stipulated by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the Fed started conducting annual 
stress tests of any bank holding companies (BHCs) with $100 billion or more in total 
consolidated assets. Starting October 2012, the rules carrying out this requirement were adopted 
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only to be modified in February 2017. The supervisory stress tests of identified banks that fit the 
criteria are conducted by the Fed, which reports on, among other things, the methodologies 
used to generate the Fed’s forecasts.  
This crisis caused many banks and financial institutions to withstand critically low levels 
of capital, even becoming under-capitalized, a situation that stress tests aim to prevent. 
The Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision (BCBS) set the Basel Accord, a three 
series of banking regulations (Basel I, II, and III) to produce recommendations relating to bank 
capital adequacy, accounting and auditing, banking problems, core principles for effective 
banking supervision, credit risk and securitization, credit, market, and operational risk, 
transparency and disclosure, among others (BIS). In the wake of the credit crisis, it became 
mandatory for banks to maintain proper leverage ratios and meet minimum capital 
requirements. Higher capital levels are essential to guarantee financial stability as they help 
create and boost liquidity levels, in addition to increasing probabilities of surviving crises 
(Thakor, 2014).     
Basel III also advanced two new types of required liquidity ratios. Similar to the reserve 
requirements that were abolished by many Basel member countries including the U.S, the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is a new regulatory tool destined to require banks to hold High 
Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) sufficient to cover net cash outflows over a period of 30 days as a 
measure of promoting short-term resilience. The LCR rule was implemented in 2014 but banks 
were expected to fully comply with it by January 2017, with a minimum compliance rate of 
100%. The second liquidity requirement is carried out by the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), 
a requirement that promotes long-term resilience by requiring banks to maintain an available 
amount of stable funding that is higher than the one required over one-year stress period4   
In the wake of the mayhem instilled by the 2008 Lehman Brothers collapse, in addition 
to poor bank governance and lousy risk management practices, the Basel III was the latest of 
                                                          
4 This information was obtained from the 2018 FMA presentation in san Diego by Dr. Christa Bouwman, Patricia & 
Bookman Peters Professor of Finance - Texas A&M University, under the title “Bank Capital and Financial Crises”. 
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Basel Accord frameworks to be developed in response to the ensuing financial crisis of 2007-
2009. Aiming to update and reinforce the regulation, prudential oversight, and risk 
management of banks, the standards of Basel III set minimum requirements that apply to active 
member banks (BIS).  
The Congress also passed a comprehensive financial reform of financial regulation 
under the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010. According to 
the 2011 testimony by Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, the objectives of this act are clear-cut and 
aim to 1) facilitate regulators’ mission of closely monitoting and handling the threats to financial 
stability that arise from institutions dubbed “Too Big To Fail”, 2) intensify the prudential 
oversight and supervision over systematicall important financia institutions (SIFIs), and 3) 
enhance the capability of financial markets to cope with unforeseen risks and shocks. Through 
its Financial Stability Oversight Council, the DF Act coordinates efforts to identify and attenuate 
any possible threats to the stability of U.S. financial system and that of institutions and markets 
within the U.S. (Federal Reserve).  
Current Banking Outlook:  
The latest 2019 Banking and Capital Markets Outlook by Deloitte paints an optimistic 
picture of the current outlook for banks in the U.S. thanks to strong economic fundamentals 
(favorable GDP growth, tax cuts, and rising interest rates) and a favorable regulatory climate 
(aggressive policy interventions and forceful regulations). One decade after the global financial 
crisis of 2007-2009, the banking industry seems to be finally on firmer grounds with a little over 
$17 trillion in total assets, higher capital levels, and higher efficiency ratios. Other metrics 
showcasing the robustness of the banking sector are the volume of non-performing loans and 
the number of failed banks.   
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the motivation. 
Section 3 covers the contribution. Section 4 presents the literature review. Section 5 describes 
data and methodology. Section 6 discusses hypotheses development. Section 7 presents 
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descriptive statistics. Section 8 discusses regression results. Section 9 presents our empirical 
findings. Section 10 concludes. 
2. Financial regulation, financial stability, and lessons from the recent financial 
crisis 
 
As we know, a decade has passed since the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009 and as of 
today, financial regulation is still at the center of heated debates. We take advantage of the 
opportunity of ten-year anniversary of the financial crisis to shed the light on the role of 
financial regulation in managing the repercussions of the financial crisis and study the plan of 
action that was put forth in the aftermath of the crisis to counter-attack its detrimental effects, 
and to lower chances of its reoccurring in the near future. We plan to do so by analyzing the 
impact of recent regulatory updates post-crisis on the efficiency of large U.S. commercial banks.  
More importantly, the majority of the studies that examine the impact of bank regulation 
on bank efficiency are either clustered around the crisis time or pre-crisis era, too general and 
looking at banks at the international level, or exclusively focus on foreign countries. Barth et al. 
(2013) for example, explores the role of bank regulation, supervising, and monitoring in 
promoting or impeding bank operating efficiency using a bank observations from 72 countries; 
while Ghosh et al. (2006) also investigate the relationship between capital regulation and bank 
efficiency for Indian, state-owned banks. More recent studies mostly deal with non-U.S. 
financial institutions such as Pradhan et al. (2017) who examine the effect of capital adequacy on 
financial performance of Nepalese commercial banks, as proxied by bank operating efficiency 
levels; Odunga (2013) who studies the operating efficiency, liquidity, and capital adequacy of 
commercial banks in Kenya, and Lotto (2018) who empirically examines the impact of bank 
capital regulations on the operating efficiency of banks in Tanzania.  
Moreover, some of the major trending topics nowadays are lessons learned from the 
financial crisis; and how close we may be to the next one. Inquiries about the well-being and 
sustainability of the financial system and whether it has recovered or not are often brought up 
in every discussion panel. Finally, there is a large concern from stakeholders about preventative 
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measures and whether the current regulatory measures in place, are efficient in preventing the 
next financial crisis.   
  
Motivated by previous studies, especially (Berger and Bowman, 2013) and (Thakor, 
2014), this paper looks specifically at possible determinants of performance of large commercial 
banks by examining the recent capital and leverage regulatory requirements in the U.S., in a 
quest to help policy makers evaluate the recent requirements imposed on banks in the 
aftermath of the crisis. We have chosen to designate operating efficiency as a proxy for 
performance measure in this study since the concept of efficiency for banks is deeply rooted in 
the literature.     
This study focuses solely on large commercial bank with $15 billion or higher in 
consolidated assets as of December 31, 2017. We have previously highlighted the importance of 
large commercial banks in the US as they the backbone of local and national economies, in that 
they control massive assets, provide reliable lending, and recent studies show they are destined 
for more growth and expansion by 2019.  
Another equally important motive to dig deeper into this topic are the recent talks about 
dismantling the Dodd Frank Act of 2010, which is considered as one of the pillars of the 
financial regulation post-crisis. In January 2018, Randal Quarles, the Vice Chairman for Bank 
Supervision of the Federal Reserve Board expressed his concern about current regulations in 
banking industry being standardized and extreme. He also demanded those regulations to be 
softened and customized to promote commercial bank activities such as lending, investment, 
and stock market trading.  
 
3. Regulation Impact on Efficiency of Financial System and Banks post financial 
crisis    
We aim to enrich the literature on the effect of financial regulation on the operating 
efficiency of U.S. commercial banks, measured as the ratio of operating expenses to operating 
income, through a specific study that is to our knowledge, the first to be carried out for large 
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U.S. commercial banks. Our goal is to study the combined effects of regulatory capital, liquidity, 
common equity, and leverage requirements on banks’ operational efficiency.  
This essay speaks to current affairs and fuels the discussion and debates regarding 
regulation of the banking industry and financial system. To our knowledge, this is the first 
study that looks at a multi-dimensional impact of regulation. Berger and Patti (2006) used U.S. 
bank sample and the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimation method to study the 
effect of bank regulations on bank profitability; their findings show that low levels of capital 
ratios increase the operating efficiency of banks. We are expanding that research topic by not 
only including an additional ten years of data, but also measuring the impact of leverage 
requirements on banks’ performance.  
Furthermore, we also test new regulatory measures introduced in the aftermath of the 
crisis through Basel III, by looking at the sub-components of the capital requirements, namely, 
the impact of the Tier 1, Tier 2, and common equity capital regulation. As recent capital 
requirements advanced by Basel III called for a stricter regulatory scheme by increasing and 
even sometimes doubling requirements, this study sheds the light on the efficacy of those steps 
as measured through the efficiency of banks subject to those requirements. The study also aims 
to reconcile the contradicting results on the impact of financial regulation on bank efficiency 
and to paint a clearer picture for policy makers. Mixed results have been reported regarding 
that impact. For example, Diamond and Rajan (2001) associated additional capital with negative 
consequences, while Berger & Bouwman (2013) found a positive association between higher 
levels of capital and a better performance of medium and large banks primarily during times of 
financial turmoil. 
We hope that our results contribute the ongoing debate of whether recent financial 
regulation made a difference in improving the general financial climate by pushing banks and 
financial institutions in the U.S. into the right direction, or it has impeded bank performance by 
imposing far stringent requirements and controlling the risk-taking behavior of banks. 
Eventually, our attempt of studying if current financial regulations are indeed too rigid and 
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need to be relaxed will help rule in favor of or against views calling for an abolition of the Dodd 
Frank Act of 2010.5        
 
4. Literature Review 
 
4.1 On Bank Efficiency and Capital Regulation     
 
Efficiency refers to an individual or organization’s ability to generate a desired outcome 
with the least of efforts and expenditures (Cooper, 2004). Efficiency falls under two broad 
categories; an economic efficiency that is seen from the perspective of an economy as a whole 
and an operational efficiency that is considered by the individual business enterprise.6                 
Generally speaking, operational efficiency refers to the efficient utilization of human and 
material resources, such as machines, tools equipment, materials, or funds. In the banking 
sector, the concept of efficiency is similar, as it is focused on maintaining a healthy balance 
between cost (input) and productivity (output). Moreover, research analysts look at the 
importance of operational efficiency at the banking sector from multiple different perspectives 
to highlight why bank efficiency is of primordial importance.  
For instance, depositors trust an efficient bank with their deposits, which creates less 
hostile environment for bank runs or chaos when a crisis unfolds. Shareholders view in an 
efficient bank the opportunity of higher returns, in addition to providing a more stable and 
solid investment climate. 
From a regulator point of view, efficient banks are a cornerstone to the prosperity of the 
financial system and of the overall economy; they play a major role in guaranteeing a stable 
economic environment and their failure can be extremely costly, even giving rise to massive 
financial disturbances, as was the case in 2007. In brief, the efficiency of banks has always been a 
                                                          
5 Since it passed in 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act has been the target of animosity by many conservatives and the banking industry. 
On May 22, 2018, the Congress approved a bill to dismantle parts of the Dodd-Frank banking rule to lessen scrutiny on lending 
practices for mid-size banks 
6 Visit http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/24126/10/10_chapter4.pdf for a Chapter on Operational Efficiency in 
Banking Sector in India- A Conceptual Framework/ Chapter 4. 
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matter of serious interest to the regulators, stakeholders, clients, and managers alike. Given the 
importance of bank efficiency, many scholars made it their priority to gauge how bank 
efficiency affects stability, while others looked at possible determinants of efficiency. Our study 
builds upon previous studies in examining whether regulatory pressures in the form of capital 
and leverage requirements could possibly determine bank operating efficiency.  
 
The majority of previous studies focus on capital regulation, thus scrutinizing the 
relationship between capital regulatory requirements and bank efficiency. With bank capital 
being of uttered importance in the resilience, survival, and prosperity of banks, one view that 
emerged regarding the role of capital regulation is the “Traditional View”. In discussing the role 
of capital regulation, Kashyap et al. (2008) summarize the Traditional View as resting on four 
premises: protecting the deposit insurer and society against the adverse impact of bank failures; 
aligning incentives of shareholders and management; charging higher capital for riskier assets 
and forcing banks with a history of trouble to be re-authorized from the capital market before 
they could continue operating. Kashyap et al. (2008) also discuss the main flaws in that view as 
presented in the Basel I and II frameworks.  
In fact, there exist mixed views concerning the manner regulatory power influences 
bank efficiency. From the one hand, Acharya, Mehran, and Thakor (2011) detect a positive 
relationship between capital regulation and bank performance, while addressing bank capital 
concerns such as why banks are highly levered and the consequences of this leverage for the 
economy. Thakor (2014) directs his research effort towards exposing the role played by capital 
in creating and sustaining financial stability, only to conclude that “higher capital requirements 
seem beneficial”.  
From the other hand, other studies report contradicting findings, such as Berger & Patti 
(2006) who use U.S. bank sample to study the impact of bank regulations on bank profitability, 
and find that the operating efficiency of banks increases with lower capital ratios; Diamond and 
Rajan (2001) designate some negative consequences of large levels of capital; while Calomiris & 
Kahn (1991) find that bank performance is adversely affected by tighter capital regulation. 
12 
 
Chortareas, Girardone, & Ventouri (2010) conclude that interventionist supervisory & 
regulatory policies significantly obstruct efficient operations of banks. Interestingly, in a later 
study that examines how capital requirements influence the operating efficiency of commercial 
bank in 22 EU countries, Chortareas et al., (2010) find that higher levels of capital requirements 
improve operation efficiency of banks, rather than hampering it.  
Finally, there is the neutral view that argues that compliance with regulatory 
requirements has a marginal effect on bank efficiency. Adding further evidence to support this 
view, Ayadi et al. (2016) conclude in a recent study that compliance with either Basel Core 
Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCP) or with any of its individual chapters, is not 
associated with bank operating efficiency whatsoever, and that result holds after controlling for 
several characteristics at the bank level, the macroeconomic level, and institutional quality. 
Their claim corroborates the argument that compliance impact on bank efficiency is a frail one.    
Berger & Bouwman (2013) achieve different results after they empirically examine the 
impact of capital on bank’s performance and reveal that indeed, capital ameliorates the 
performance of medium and large banks especially during times of increased financial turmoil. 
Another equally-important finding is that higher levels of capital improve small banks’ survival 
chances and increase their market share at all times.   
In carrying out this study, we believe it is extremely important to fully understand the 
regulator’s rationale behind setting up statutory requirements and forcing banks to abide by 
them. Inherently, the banking industry is a risky one since not only does it respond to interest 
rates fluctuations and is subject to frictions arising from banks being fiercely competitive 
competitors; but it is also based on lending activities that may sometimes prove detrimental in 
case of non-performing loans or outright default. Thus, from the regulator’s standpoint, banks 
are expected to be well-capitalized in the face of uncertainties and unforeseen crises. Meeting or 
even better, exceeding capital requirements, puts not only the bank at ease, but also the whole 
banking and closely-related financial sector. Increasing capital adequacy of banks is then one of 
the life-long goals of regulators in their quest of guaranteeing a safe and sound economic 
environment.  
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One more advantage for being well-capitalized is explained by Thakor (1996) whose 
findings suggest that larger levels of capital increase banks’ financial capabilities in seeking 
profitable endeavors and projects, develop operations, and tackle higher levels of risk. On the 
other hand, banks that suffer from limited capital, hence under-capitalized, tend to refrain from 
the risky practice of investing large sums in lending activities, and opt to invest in riskless 
government securities, which may be a far less profitable route. Similarly, claims made by 
Berger & Patti (2006) support the notion that banks’ risk-taking activities become limited upon 
going beyond the minimum regulatory capital ratios.  
Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008) articulate several broad principles for reform and offer 
one specific recommendation in terms of capital insurance to be implemented on an opt-in 
basis, in combination with other reforms. Kashyap et al. (2008) also discuss governance issues in 
banks in addition to excessive short-term leverage; they argue that direct regulatory 
interventions, especially in the form of requiring more capital, could indeed aggravate private 
sector attempts to solve them, as well as hinder economic growth and stability. At the same 
time, continuous efforts to rescue the banking system may be extremely costly for society; 
similarly, exposing the economy to the financial created by banking crises create could also 
carry several costs.  
Berger & Bouwman (2013) acknowledge that literature presents many divergent views 
of this topic, claiming that issues such as the effects of capital on the performance of banks, the 
frequency and magnitude of these effects, and the degree to which they are different according 
to the nature of the crisis is worthy of lengthy discussions.    
Ayadi et al. (2016) also contribute to the ongoing policy debate by shedding light on 
compliance issues, through assessing the effectiveness of complying with international bodies 
of regulation on bank supervision in enhancing bank operating efficiency. They focus on 
regulatory compliance and defend their focus by the fact that the former can affect bank 
performance through a multitude of channels, such as lending; asset allocation; or funding 
decisions. They also find that regulatory compliance is costly for banks.  
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4.2 On Regulatory Requirements and Financial Crisis:  
Discussions of the supervisory role of the government and other governing authorities 
are often renewed in the event of a crisis. Government’s regulatory intervention has been 
approached in several studies. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine (2004) study the impact of 
different bank supervisory policies in easing or intensifying bank corruption as an obstacle to 
firms’ activities. They highlight the striking differences among several approaches to 
supervision and among theories focusing on the role of the government within the economy. 
Among of the theories discussed in their study is the Supervision theory that argues 
governments possess both the expertise and the incentives to improve market imperfections 
and ameliorate the banks’ governance. An alternative theory that distances capital regulation 
from any possible impact of bank efficiency would be the Political-Regulatory Capture View 
that assumes politicians and supervisors alike are more concerned with their own welfare in 
lieu of maximizing the social welfare (Becker, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). Finally, the 
Private Empowerment View argues that improving incentives and capabilities of private agents 
should become the main priority of bank supervisory policies in order to curtail information 
and transaction costs; it also seeks to encourage supervisors to foster necessary responsibility 
and authority to encourage a more transparent disclosure of banks’ accurate information to the 
general public (Hay and Shleifer, 1998).    
Long before the recent crisis shook the U.S. financial markets to their very core, studies 
highlighted the necessity of supervisory authorities in steering the governance of banks and 
financial institutions to a safe harbor. Beck et al. (2004) claim that the Basel Committee, 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank aim to encourage the development of strong 
bank supervisory agencies through directly monitoring and firmly disciplining banks. When 
the crisis hit, regulators had to take drastic measures in response, whether through tightening 
controls, requiring higher capital buffers, or imposing new laws to counter-attack the 
detrimental effect of the crisis. In the aftermath of the crisis, many studies found it appropriate 
to revisit the regulation effect topic. For example, Claessens & Kodres (2014) discuss the 
regulatory reactions to the recent global financial crisis to date; and in the light of lessons from 
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recent and past financial crises and insights from analytical and empirical studies, they identify 
the challenges faced in enabling and promoting a stable and efficient financial system. They 
identify three tenets necessary for reforms, mainly maintaining a system-wide outlook to tackle 
market failures; align the incentives and goals of both regulations agents and society and admit 
that a potential risk for crisis will always exist, regardless of preventative efforts.  
Financial crises pose serious threats to the stability of any financial system around the 
world. Following a study on the impact of capital on financial stability, Thakor (2014) claims 
that financial crises breed large, persistent social costs, emphasizing the importance of banking 
stability. Thakor (2014) also credits higher capital levels with lowering the probability of bank 
insolvencies and crises, in addition to speeding up the post-crisis recovery of the economy, 
thanks to better-capitalized banks having stronger screening incentives (Coval & Thakor, 2005) 
and monitoring incentives (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1993; Mehran & Thakor, 2011) to give them an 
edge in lending; a view that many banks do not completely agree with. In fact, many large 
CEOs expressed their dislike of higher capital requirements and voiced out their blunt 
resistance. Jamie Dimon, Chairman and CEO of J.P. Morgan Chase, claims in his April 2017 
annual letter to shareholders that banks have excessive levels of capital, while Lloyd Blankfein, 
Chairman and CEO of Goldman Sachs, argues at a February 2017 investor conference7 that they 
would prefer to hold far less levels of capital if they had a choice.  
Quotes like these in our opinion only corroborate that banks need strong supervision 
and a uniform body of regulatory policies to keep the banking sector in check and far from 
CEO’s and large block holders’ whims. In response to increased demands to relax the tight 
restrictions on capital, Thakor (2014) explains this behavior by a handful of possible reasons 
such as tax benefit of debt, funding cost advantage, catering to ROE-focused investors, and the 
fact that CEO bonuses are tied to ROE.  
A total of 465 insured U.S. commercial banks failed between January 2008 and December 
2012. Governments’ current supervisory tools such as guaranteeing a certain level of capital 
                                                          
7 From the presentation of Dr. Christa Bouwman, FMA 2018, San Diego 
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adequacy among banks reflect the government’s sincere concern about what a potential 
financial crisis may bring about in terms of insolvency, distress, and failure.  
According to Sykes (2018), in the case of the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009 and 
similar crises, when systematically large banks and financial institutions become insolvent or 
distressed, the burden falls on taxpayers through taxpayer-funded bailout (AIG 2007 massive 
bailout for example), higher taxes, or the financial system gets destabilized, in what is known as 
the “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) problem. Sykes (2018) also claims that the recent crisis exposed not 
only the inadequacy of micro-prudential regulation imposed on large financial institutions, but 
also the bankruptcy system for resolving the insolvencies of such institutions. The TBTF 
problem came under the radar during the 2007-2009 financial crisis as a noteworthy problem, 
when several large banking institutions experienced rigorous distress, prompting the federal 
government to initiate a massive bailout operation by committing hundreds of billions of 
dollars as an intervention tactic to rescue those ailing institutions, and it did so for the sake of 
restoring the stability of the financial system (Sykes, 2018).   
In reaction to a financial crisis whose reach has expanded from affecting U.S. financial 
markets to a widespread impact on the global financial system, former President Obama signed 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) into law in 
2010, of which Titles I and II are specifically designed to minimize the systemic risk brought 
about by financial institutions dubbed “too big to fail”.     
The objective of financial regulation for the banking industry from the perspective of 
regulators is clear-cut; i.e. to guide banks and financial institutions towards safety and solvency, 
and ultimately grant the overall financial stability and minimize the potential of financial crises. 
In spite of the resistance movement against higher capital requirements, deregulation of the 
banking sector is far from being a reality due to the systemic importance of banks within the 
economy.     
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5. Data & Methodology 
5.1.  Sample Collection 
Our sample comprises an unbalanced panel of annual observations for 68 commercial 
banks in the U.S., each with total consolidated assets of $15 billion or more, valued at 2017 U.S. 
Dollars and spanning a period from 2000 to 2017. We carefully chose this time period to capture 
the behavior of the impact of regulatory changes on the efficiency of U.S. commercial banks. 
Our study is based on matching bank-level information with a multitude of bank regulatory 
measures to investigate the dynamics of the relationship between bank efficiency and bank 
regulation measures.     
We retrieve annual data on U.S. commercial banks that satisfy the criteria of being a 
member of the Federal Reserve in addition to being nationally or state-chartered. Our data 
comes from FDIC Call Reports 2000: Q1-2017: Q4, in addition to being hand-collected from 
participating banks’ financial statements and annual reports. The list of the 68 banks and their 
characteristics as of December 31, 2017 is obtained from the Federal Reserve Board Statistical 
Release of December, 31, 2017 and is presented in Table 1.  
Table 1: List of Large U.S. Commercial Banks with Consolidated assets of $15 billion and Higher 
Table 1 presents the list of 68 U.S. commercial banks, ranked in terms of their consolidated assets. The table shows banks that 
satisfy our sampling criteria of being a member of the Federal Reserve in addition to being nationally or state-chartered. This 
table comes from the Federal Reserve Board statistical release of December 31, 2017, which the Fed obtains from the 
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income filed quarterly by banks (FFIEC 031 and 041) and from other information in the 
Board's National Information Center database. Banks that are located in U.S. territories and possessions are not included in the 
table. 
Bank Name/  Holding Company Name       
National 
Rank  
Bank ID Bank Location  Charter  
Consol. 
Assets 
($mil) 
Domestic 
assets 
($mil) 
JPMORGAN CHASE BK NA/ 
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 
1 852218 COLUMBUS, OH NAT 2,140,778 1,649,874 
BANK OF AMER NA/ BANK OF 
AMER CORP 
2 480228 CHARLOTTE, NC NAT 1,751,524 1,642,198 
WELLS FARGO BK NA/    WELLS 
FARGO & CO 
3 451965 SIOUX FALLS, SD NAT 1,747,354 1,688,983 
CITIBANK NA/  CITIGROUP 4 476810 SIOUX FALLS, SD NAT 1,384,707 845,800 
U S BK NA/     U S BC 5 504713 CINCINNATI, OH NAT 456,026 444,720 
PNC BK NA/    PNC FNCL SVC 
GROUP 
6 817824 WILMINGTON, DE NAT 370,002 365,906 
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BANK OF NY MELLON/    BANK OF 
NY MELLON CORP 
7 541101 NEW YORK, NY SMB 297,305 182,415 
CAPITAL ONE NA /    CAPITAL ONE 
FC 
8 112837 MC LEAN, VA NAT 290,651 290,581 
T D BK NA/    TD GRP US HOLDS 
LLC 
9 497404 WILMINGTON, DE NAT 288,294 288,294 
STATE STREET B&TC /    STATE 
STREET CORP 
10 35301 BOSTON, MA SMB 235,022 151,127 
SUNTRUST BK/  SUNTRUST BK 12 675332 ATLANTA, GA SMB 201,638 201,638 
HSBC BK USA NA /    HSBC N AMER 
HOLDS 
13 413208 MC LEAN, VA NAT 180,372 177,444 
GOLDMAN SACHS BK USA /    
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP THE 
14 2182786 NEW YORK, NY SMB 164,539 164,539 
CHASE BK USA NA  /    JPMORGAN 
CHASE & CO 
15 489913 WILMINGTON, DE NAT 143,801 143,801 
FIFTH THIRD BK /    FIFTH THIRD 
BC 
16 723112 CINCINNATI, OH SMB 140,078 139,525 
NORTHERN TC  /    NORTHERN TR 
CORP 
17 210434 CHICAGO, IL SMB 138,163 92,313 
ALLY BK /     ALLY FNCL 18 3284070 SANDY, UT SMB 137,474 137,474 
KEYBANK NA / KEYCORP 19 280110 CLEVELAND, OH NAT 135,758 135,733 
MORGAN STANLEY BK NA/    
MORGAN STANLEY 
20 1456501 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
UT 
NAT 129,707 129,707 
REGIONS BK /    REGIONS FC  21 233031 BIRMINGHAM, AL SMB 123,325 123,325 
CITIZENS BK NA /    CITIZENS FNCL 
GRP 
22 3303298 PROVIDENCE, RI NAT 121,996 121,996 
CAPITAL ONE BK USA NA  /    
CAPITAL ONE FC 
23 2253891 GLEN ALLEN, VA NAT 119,556 118,325 
MUFG UNION BK NA  /    MUFG 
AMERS HOLDS CORP 
24 212465 
SAN FRANCISCO, 
CA 
NAT 118,537 118,533 
MANUFACTURERS & TRADERS TC /    
M&T BK CORP 
25 501105 BUFFALO, NY SMB 118,072 118,072 
BMO HARRIS BK NA /    BMO FNCL 
CORP 
26 75633 CHICAGO, IL NAT 109,373 109,373 
HUNTINGTON NB  /    HUNTINGTON 
BSHRS 
27 12311 COLUMBUS, OH NAT 104,052 104,052 
COMPASS BK /    BBVA COMPASS 
BSHRS 
31 697633 BIRMINGHAM, AL SMB 86,505 86,505 
SANTANDER BK NA /    
SANTANDER HOLDS USA 
32 722777 WILMINGTON, DE NAT 74,450 74,436 
COMERICA BK / COMERICA 33 60143 DALLAS, TX SMB 71,609 71,097 
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ZB NA   /    ZIONS BC 34 276579 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
UT 
NAT 66,081 66,081 
MORGAN STANLEY PRIV BK NA  /    
MORGAN STANLEY 
35 2489805 PURCHASE, NY NAT 65,127 65,127 
SILICON VALLEY BK 36 802866 
SANTA CLARA, 
CA 
SMB 50,388 48,225 
CITY NB 37 63069 LOS ANGELES, CA NAT 47,934 47,934 
PEOPLES UNITED BK NA 38 613307 BRIDGEPORT, CT NAT 44,198 44,198 
DEUTSCHE BK TC AMERICAS 39 214807 NEW YORK, NY SMB 43,390 43,390 
FIRST TN BK NA 41 485559 MEMPHIS, TN NAT 41,201 41,201 
CIT BK NA 42 3918898 PASADENA, CA NAT 40,747 40,747 
EAST WEST BK 43 197478 PASADENA, CA SMB 37,120 35,215 
BOKF NA 46 339858 TULSA, OK NAT 32,217 32,217 
FROST BK 47 682563 SAN ANTONIO, TX SMB 31,797 31,797 
FIRST NB OF PA 48 379920 GREENVILLE, PA NAT 31,212 31,212 
SYNOVUS BK 49 395238 COLUMBUS, GA SMB 31,106 31,106 
ASSOCIATED BK NA 50 917742 GREEN BAY, WI NAT 30,422 30,422 
STERLING NB 51 125471 MONTEBELLO, NY NAT 30,342 30,342 
BANKUNITED NA 52 3938186 MIAMI LAKES, FL NAT 30,280 30,280 
IBERIABANK 53 808176 LAFAYETTE, LA SMB 27,824 27,824 
WEBSTER BK NA 55 761806 WATERBURY, CT NAT 26,488 26,488 
TEXAS CAP BK NA 58 2618780 DALLAS, TX NAT 25,055 25,055 
COMMERCE BK 60 601050 KANSAS CITY, MO SMB 24,728 24,728 
VALLEY NB 61 229801 PASSAIC, NJ NAT 23,965 23,965 
BNY MELLON NA 62 934329 PITTSBURGH, PA NAT 23,950 23,950 
T D BK USA NA 63 2121196 WILMINGTON, DE NAT 23,364 23,364 
TCF NB 64 266271 SIOUX FALLS, SD NAT 23,021 22,663 
RAYMOND JAMES BK NA 67 2193616 
SAINT 
PETERSBURG, FL 
NAT 21,867 21,759 
UMB BK NA 68 936855 KANSAS CITY, MO NAT 21,558 21,558 
WESTERN ALLI BK 71 3138146 PHOENIX, AZ SMB 20,404 20,404 
FIRST NB OF OMAHA 72 527954 OMAHA, NE NAT 20,351 20,351 
MB FNCL BK NA 73 656733 CHICAGO, IL NAT 20,030 20,017 
BANK OF AMER CA NA 74 1443266 
SAN FRANCISCO, 
CA 
NAT 19,804 19,804 
CHEMICAL BK 75 542649 MIDLAND, MI SMB 19,237 19,237 
UNITED BK 76 365325 FAIRFAX, VA SMB 19,042 19,042 
FIRSTBANK 77 288853 LAKEWOOD, CO SMB 17,509 17,509 
OLD NB 78 208244 VANSVILLE, IN NAT 17,423 17,423 
BANK OF HAWAII 79 795968 HONOLULU, HI SMB 17,062 16,525 
ARVEST BK 80 311845 
FAYETTEVILLE, 
AR 
SMB 16,759 16,759 
WASHINGTON FED NA 82 656377 SEATTLE, WA NAT 15,585 15,585 
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STIFEL B&T 84 3076248 SAINT LOUIS, MO SMB 15,287 15,287 
 
 
  
5.2. Model Specification 
 
In our study, we rely on panel data analysis to investigate the behaviors of sampled 
banks across the entire period while clustering by bank ID. Although a model can be specified 
in an efficient manner to present reliable explanatory variables that account for the changes in 
the dependent variable, some unobserved heterogeneity may still be present and becomes a 
part of the error term. Speaking of the banking industry, it is commonly possible that some 
large banks follow more sophisticated strategies to increase their profitability as opposed to 
other banks that prefer modest methods of generating profits. Several common practices exist 
and make the banking industry diversified in terms of conducting operations. Moreover, the 
degree of competitiveness between banks varies from locally-based banks to nationally-based 
ones and also based on bank size.  
Thus, econometricians have resorted to specific techniques to mitigate or completely 
dislocate the shared systematic heterogeneity from the error term. With panel data being 
utilized in this study, to solve the heterogeneity problem, either a fixed effects (FE) or a random 
effects (RE) regression model are the go to solution. 
To determine a more consistent model, we run a Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test check. The 
null hypothesis for the Hausman test is that unique errors are uncorrelated with regressors, 
assuming a random effects model (Greene, 2008). The Hausman test yields a probability of chi-
squared of 0.0000, and since that value is less than 0.05; we reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that the fixed effects model is more appropriate to be implemented in our study.  
  
In a panel data analysis, the within or fixed effects estimators refer to an estimator for 
the coefficients in the regression model including those fixed effects. Those models help 
econometricians control for unobserved heterogeneity when the latter is constant over time. The 
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classical representation for FE model can be explained through the following linear unobserved 
effects model for “N” observations and “T” time periods:  
 
Yit = Xit β + αi +  μit       for t=1,......T and i=1,....N 
Where: 
Yit  = Dependent Variable 
Xit = Time-variant regressor matrix of all participating explanatory variables 
β = the k*1 matrix of parameters 
αi  = the unobserved time-invariant individual effect 
μit = error term 
 
Unlike Xit, αi cannot be directly observed; and contrary to the RE model where the 
unobserved αi is independent of Xit (remember that the RE effect assumption is that individual 
specific effects are uncorrelated with explanatory variables), the FE model allows αi to be 
correlated with the independent variables, i.e. the regressor matrix Xit. Since αi is unobservable, 
it cannot be directly controlled for; hence, the FE model eliminated by demeaning the variables 
using a within transformation technique and obtaining an FE estimator βhat fe by an OLS 
regression.  
Note that Stata allows a GLS random effect regression while allowing an OLS fixed effect 
regression. The difference between OLS and GLS resides in the assumptions made about the 
error term of the model (Green, 2008). Hence, we carry out this study using the fixed effects (FE) 
regression analysis to investigate the effects of bank-specific capital adequacy ratios, leverage 
ratios, and other characteristics on bank operating efficiency.      
 
5.3.  Empirical Approach and Definition of Variables:  
As mentioned before, the recent crisis highlighted the fragility of the regulatory and 
supervisory policies that govern the bank sectors, with major U.S. banks becoming insolvent 
and in dire need of rescue through government funding and bailout, such as AIG, Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, etc. Thakor (2018)8 finds empirical evidence suggesting that the 2007-2009 crisis 
was an insolvency crisis, not a liquidity crisis and it was unavoidable to blame the banks that 
were in the eye of the storm from stirring such turmoil in financial markets and launching a 
                                                          
8 From the presentation of Dr. Christa Bouwman, FMA 2018, San Diego 
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credit crisis through being ill-capitalized. Hence, the importance of capital regulation surfaced 
in renewed related discussions; new laws and accords followed shortly after. The Dodd Frank 
Act came into law in 2010, followed by adjustments to Basel II in the form of Basel III, of which 
the U.S. is a participating member, and which proposed and forced increased capital, leverage, 
and liquidity minimums for U.S. banks to abide by.   
In the aftermath of the crisis, banks have been thriving, and this leads us to suspect that 
recently enacted capital regulatory policies may play a role in improving bank efficiency in the 
US. “Banks across the U.S. are now showing signs of well-capitalization, strong credit quality, and 
steady growth overall”.9  However, a myriad of previous studies find that capital regulation 
impedes bank performance and financial stability by limiting risky investments that banks, 
subject to the capital regulation, may embark in. This becomes worthy of investigation.  
Besides increasing the core capital requirements, what Basel III brought about is a 
stricter focus on a minimum amount of common equity and a minimum liquidity ratio as 
potential safeguards.  
The accord also includes additional requirements for "systemically important banks," 
(SIBs), or any financial institution that may be dubbed "too big to fail." Basel III was subject to a 
gradual implementation that began in January 2013 and that is expected to be completed by 
January 1, 2019 (BIS). More specifically, Basel III capital and liquidity framework covers three 
areas: capital adequacy requirements, leverage requirements, and liquidity requirements. The 
main empirical model of this study looks at the possible impact of regulatory capital 
requirements in general through the effect of the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) on bank 
efficiency. As the capital regulatory framework has witnessed drastic changes following the 
financial crisis, in terms of increasing minimum requirements and establishing new capital 
buffers, it is very helpful to examine more in depth whether these new rules have affected bank 
inefficiency in any possible way. Hence, we look at the two categories that make up the core 
                                                          
9 This is according to S&P Global Market Intelligence, 2018.  
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capital, Tier 1 and tier 2 risk-based ratios, in addition to another precautionary tool called CET 1 
ratio.  
A second possible determinant of bank efficiency is the core capital leverage 
requirement, proxied by the core capital leverage ratio (rbclaaj). Under Basel III, total capital is 
made of Tier 1 and Tier II capital, so, we break down the impact of capital regulation by looking 
at the combined, and afterwards, the individual impact of those two components of total 
capital. Finally, as the banking industry is a risky sector, banks and other financial institutions 
are exposed to elevated risk exposures that may come in the form of either systemic risk for the 
large, more inter-connected banks or credit risk for any bank with lending activities. This study 
also examines the impact of credit risk, proxied by the net charge-offs to loans ratio (ntlnlsr).  
For more robustness, we control for some factors that may have an impact on the 
relationship between capital adequacy and operating efficiency for banks. The first control 
group is a vector of bank-level characteristics that captures bank-portfolio characteristics such 
as bank size and return on assets. In addition, we control for the macro-economic environment 
commonly used in banking industry-related literature; those macro-economic 
environment controls are GDP and inflation rate. More details on all the above variables will 
follow shortly.    
We propose the following empirical model:     
 
eeffr,t = β0 + β1 CARi,t + β2 rbc1waj i,t  + β3 T2capratio i,t   + β4 Bank-Control  + β5 Macroeconomic  (1)   
Environment    +  μit                                
Where:  
 
eeffr = 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠−𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒+𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
 
 
The literature broadly defines bank operating efficiency as the ratio of operating 
expenses to operating income. Ayadi et al. (2016) describe bank operating efficiency as the 
interval between an actual production process and the optimal practice or standard. In this 
study, we hope that bank operating efficiency captures the performance of commercial banks 
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and measures their ability to use their assets to generate income, i.e. how well input can be cost-
effectively utilized to create output.  
While the Fed establishes capital requirements in the form of well-capitalized standards 
for the consolidated financial holding companies (BHCs), the OCC establishes similar minimum 
capital requirements and standards for banks under the BHCs’ umbrella, and under Basel III, 
minimum capital ratios are established in addition to general capital adequacy standards for 
large and internationally-active U.S. BHCs and commercial banks.   
Pradhan et al. (2017) define bank operating efficiency as a bank’s ability to produce 
output while reducing its related expenditure without compromising the quality of production. 
Interestingly, while the banking performance literature has agreed on bank operating efficiency 
ratio as a proxy for bank operating efficiency, it has not completely agreed on a uniform 
definition of that ratio, or on its interpretation in the process. While total operating income to 
total operating expense ratio is the proxy for a bank’s operational efficiency (Pradhan et al., 2017 
and Odunga, 2013), prior literature defines the operating efficiency as the operating expenses 
over operating income (Lotto, 2018). In line with the former view, Hassan (2002) concludes that 
the ability of a bank to effectively manage its operating expenses is reflected in a high 
operational efficiency ratio; which is likely to have a positive impact on profitability; a view that 
treats a higher efficiency ratio as a favorable sign of a better performance and increased 
profitability. However, in the banking industry, an efficiency ratio of 50% is considered the 
maximum optimal efficiency ratio and the literature shows that a lower efficiency ratio indicates 
a bank’s good performance and profitability. As a result, this study employs the latter view, i.e. 
bank operating efficiency as a ratio of operating expenses to operating income.    
 
CAR (Capital Adequacy Ratio) = 
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙+𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 2 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 
Following Gul et al., (2011) and Lotto (2006), we measure the capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR) as the ratio of total bank capital to the assets, and we specifically use risk-weighted 
assets, defined as the bank’s off balance sheet exposure weighted according to its risk profile, 
since this type of asset calculation is used in determining the capital requirements or capital 
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adequacy ratio (CAR) for a financial institution. In fact, in the U.S., the overall bank capital 
requirement is partially based on the weighted risk of a bank’s assets, obtained by multiplying 
on and off-balance sheet item by risk weights that range from zero to 200% (FDIC). According 
to Lotto (2006), capital adequacy is a measure of the financial strength and sustainability of 
bank capital in the face of adverse economic and financial circumstances. Under Basel III, the 
regulatory or risk-based capital is divided into three categories, Tier I capital, Tier 2 capital, and 
Common equity Tier 1 capital. All of these categories make up the total capital, which is defined 
as the sum of Tier I capital and Tier II capital. By measuring the level of capital adequacy, CAR 
also captures the bank’s risk of insolvency from excessive losses.    
Under Basel II, the original Risk-Based Capital ratio was 8%; after Basel III went into 
effect, it added a +2.5% Capital Conservation Buffer (CCB), which is applicable to all banks in 
the U.S., bringing the regulatory total capital requirement to 10.5% 10  
  
rbc1waj (Tier 1Capital Ratio) = 
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
  
 
As disclosed on J.P. Morgan Chase & Co’s 2017 Annual Report, Tier I risk-based capital 
is the main component of a bank’s total capital and it comprises common stockholder’s equity 
plus additional Tier 1 capital made of perpetual preferred stock.  
Under Basel II, Tier I risk-based capital was at 4%. With the enactment of Basel III, it 
went up by +2% as a minimum increase, then by +2.5% as a Capital Conservation Buffer (a total 
of +4.5% increase), reaching 8.5% Tier 1 capital requirements. 
 
T2CR (Tier 1 Supplementary Capital Ratio) = 
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 2 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 
 
Tier 2 risk-based capital is the secondary element that make up total bank capital under 
Basel III and it consists of long-term debt qualifying as Tier 2, in addition to qualifying 
allowance for credit losses, revaluation reserves, and hybrid debt. Similar to Tier 1 capital ratio, 
                                                          
10 This is according to S&P Global Market Intelligence, 2018.  
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it is calculated based on the weighted risk of a bank’s assets; however, the calculation of Tier 2 
capital itself proves to be more complicated since it is composed of less-liquid assets. Equally 
important is to mention that Tier 2 capital is composed of two levels. Upper-level Tier 2 capital 
is perpetual and superior to preferred capital and equity, while the Lower-lave Tier 2 capital is 
inexpensive for a bank to issue.        
 
Bank-Control = a vector capturing bank portfolio characteristics and includes bank assets as a 
proxy for bank size and returns on assets that captures bank profitability.  
 
Asset = Total Assets  
According to Berger and Bouwman (2013), the literature documents differences by bank 
size in terms of portfolio composition (e.g., Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2002; Berger, Miller, 
Petersen, Rajan, and Stein, 2005). We follow prior empirical studies in considering total assets as 
a proxy for bank size. Also, a plethora of empirical studies both in accounting and finance, 
(Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Daley, 1984; and Foster, 1977) have also relied on total assets as a 
proxy for the firm size.   
 
ROA (Return on Assets) = 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 
 
The second bank characteristic we control for is return on assets (roa), which is a 
profitability ratio that captures how efficient a bank’s management is in generating earnings 
from their assets.  
According to the literature, a high ROA indicates solid operating performance, and that 
the bank is more efficient at generating profits.  
Macroeconomic Environment= a vector of country-level control variables including gross 
domestic product in the U.S. as a proxy for economic growth in addition to the inflation rate in 
the U.S. to capture general financial conditions.  
LGDP= the natural log of the real gross domestic product.  
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Economists rely on real GDP as a macroeconomic tool of monitoring the growth of 
output in an economy, as it is concerned with the total value produced using constant prices, 
thus isolating the effect of price change or inflation. As such, real GDP has been commonly 
utilized to gauge changes in the level of output of an economy. We have chosen to take the 
natural logarithm of GDP to reduce the impact of outliers in the data.  
INF= Inflation rate. 
The inflation rate (INF) is a measurement of inflation and conveys the change in prices 
level over a period of time. Our study benefits from the use of inflation rate as a measure of 
capturing a country’s general financial conditions and surroundings.  
 μ= The error term. 
Among the worries that policy makers lose sleep over is the issue of bank insolvency. 
History shows a ripple effect from bank insolvency to the financial system as a whole, and as 
mentioned before, the collapse of major banks and money centers in the US was the catalyst of a 
fierce, steep 2007-2009 global financial crisis.  
Lotto (2018) defines capital adequacy as an essential tool in safeguarding a bank’s 
solvency and maintain its profitability, since conducting banking activities is redeemed one of 
the riskiest practices in the financial market by far. Under Basel III, total capital is defined as the 
sum of Tier I capital and Tier II capital. In addition, Basel III introduces two additional capital 
buffers: the mandatory Capital Conservation Buffer (CCB) applicable to all banks in the U.S. 
and the discretionary Counter-cyclical Capital Buffer (CcyB) applicable to Advanced 
Approached Banks.  
The relevance of capital adequacy in the banking system may be inherited to the 
existence of prospective information asymmetries between bank management and borrowers, 
which in the case of default, causes banks to sustain considerable losses, and what better 
measure to be prepared for such scenario other than having adequate capital in place (Lotto, 
2018). It is argued that the main focus of bank supervisory policies should be on boosting the 
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capabilities of private investors to surmount information barriers and improve existing bank 
monitoring and governance efforts (Beck et al., 2006). When certain government policies or costs 
in the form of information or transactions costs obstruct the capabilities of private agents to 
exercise effecting monitoring on banks, a powerful official supervision of banks can ameliorate 
their corporate governance (Stigler, 1971); a view that is known as the Supervisory power view.     
 
 Additional Explanatory Variables:  
 
RBCET1= 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 
 
The Common Equity Tier I Risk-Based Capital ratio (RBCET1) is a part of Tier 1 risk-
based capital and it comprises common stockholder’s equity. Under Basel III, CET1 was at 2%; 
the Minimum Increase of Basel III brought about +2.5% minimum increase, in addition to a 
similar +2.5% Capital Conservation Buffer (CCB), bringing the CET1 ratio for all U.S. banks to 
7%. 
CET1 is one of the main measures of bank solvency that gauges a bank’s capital strength 
by measuring the bank’s common equity capital against its assets. Note that all capital ratio 
formulas (CAR, Tier 1 capital ratio, Tier 2 capital ratio, and Common Equity Tier 1 ratio) share 
the same denominator, i.e. they are all expressed as a percentage of the risk-based or risk-
weighted assets. Since not all assets share the exact same risk, the assets acquired by the bank 
are then weighted based on the credit risk and the market risk for each asset present.  So: 
 eeffr,t = β0 + β1 RBCET1CER i,t + β2 Bank-Contro  + β3 Macroeconomic Environment +  μit  (2)  
 
 
rbclaaj  (Core Capital Leverage ratio) = 
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
𝑂𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑂𝑓𝑓−𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒  (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)
   
 
The core capital non-risk-based leverage ratio (rbclaaj) can be calculated as the ratio of 
Tier I capital to the bank’s total exposure, i.e. its average total consolidated assets. Under Basel 
III, U.S. banks are expected to maintain a leverage ratio in excess of 4%, which is a minimum 
requirement that all U.S. commercial banks need to comply with. In July 2013, the Fed 
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announced a special treatment for certain systematically important financial institutions (SIFIs); 
the minimum Basel III leverage ratio for 8 SIFIs is 6% for the banks and 5% for their insured 
BHCs. So:  
eeffr,t = β0 + β2 rbclaaj i,t + β3 Bank-Control +  β4 Macroeconomic Environment +  μit  (3) 
ntlnlsr  = 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒−𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠  
  
 
A net charge-off is the dollar amount that represents the difference between gross 
charge-offs and what was subsequently recovered of outstanding delinquent debt. The Federal 
Reserve defines the net charge-offs to loans and leases ratio as net charge-offs expressed as a 
percentage of loans and leases. This ratio proxies for credit risk and its fluctuations say a thing 
or two about the well-being of the economy and financial system altogether. During the third 
quarter of 2017, the ratio was reported at 0.44% in the U.S. compared to a staggering 3.14% 
during the fourth quarter of 2009. According to FDIC, net charge-offs are the total loans and 
leases removed from the balance sheet due to being uncollected less amounts recovered on 
loans and leases previously charged off. We use this ratio as a proxy for credit risk due to its 
similarity to what prior literature has heavily relied on as a proxy for credit risk, the NPL, or 
non-performing loans ratio. A bad loan becomes dubbed as non-performing loan when the 
debtor has not made the scheduled payments for a period of at least 90 days for commercial 
banking. So:  
 
eeffr,t = β0 + β1 ntlnlsr i,t + β2 Bank-Control + β3 Macroeconomic Environment +  μit   (4) 
 
 
nimy (Net Interest margin) = 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛−𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 
  
 
The net interest margin is a margin rate commonly used as a financial indicator in 
efficiency analysis (Wozniweska, 2008). It measures the degree to which a bank is successful at 
investing its funds compared to its expenses on the same investments. While a negative value of 
net interest margin is an alarming sign that the bank has strayed away from optimal investment 
decisions since interest expenses exceed the investments-generated returns, a positive (nimy) 
indicates that a bank has invested its funds efficiently. So:  
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eeffr,t = β0 + β1 nimy i,t + β2 Bank-Control   +  β3 Macroeconomic Environment    +  μit   (5) 
 
 
6. Hypotheses Development: 
 
The attention that regulatory authorities such as the Federal Reserve or the Basel Committee 
relate to specific banking regulations such as obligatory minimum requirements for capital, 
leverage or liquidity, may be a possible indicator of the relevance of such regulatory policies in 
the regulators’ view to steer banks towards a safe operating environment. Hence, we 
hypothesize that higher capital requirements, whether at the core capital level or at certain sub-
components level (such as Tier I and the common equity Tier 1 capital) for U.S. commercial 
increase their operating efficiency, and this effect is more highlighted in the period following 
the financial crisis (2007-2009), leading us to conclude that regulatory compliance with the 
newly advanced requirements has indeed improved the overall financial system. Therefore, we 
expect a positive correlation to exist and we want to establish that large U.S. commercial banks 
are economically efficient as a result of complying with recent financial regulation enacted in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis.  
On Capital Requirements:  
Thakor (2018) finds empirical evidence of a positive correlation between higher levels of 
capital and bank insolvency since his findings suggest that banks with higher capital ratios were 
reported to be less affected by the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Berger & Bouwman (2013) conclude 
that performance of medium and large banks is enhanced by capital, especially during times of 
banking crises; they also conclude that capital always enhances market shares of small banks as 
well as the chances of overcoming financial crises and emerging strong from those crises. We 
conjecture that increasing or strengthening regulatory requirements on capital adequacy, as 
measured by the capital adequacy ratio, Tier 1 capital ratio, and Tier 2 capital ratio, increases 
bank operating efficiency. Thus:  
Hypothesis 1: Capital adequacy requirements positively and significantly impact bank 
operating efficiency.   
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Due to the importance the regulators attach to common equity Tier 1 capital, and the 
recent drastic minimum requirements hike from 2% to 7% under Basel III, we examine its 
isolated role on bank operating efficiency. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2: Higher CET1 capital requirements have a positive and significant impact on bank 
operating efficiency.  
On Leverage Requirements:  
Under Basel III, the leverage ratio also received a special treatment where all U.S. 
commercial banks are expected to maintain 4% or higher. Overall, the capital adequacy 
literature is more focused on the total capital requirements and its immediate subdivisions. 
Little has been done to decipher the effect of leverage requirement. With that being said:      
Hypothesis 3:  Higher leverage requirements positively impact U.S. commercial banks and 
savings institutions’ operating efficiency. 
On Credit Risk Exposure:  
Credit risk for banks stems from the probability of losses as a result of borrowers failing 
to honor their borrowing agreements and not paying back their loans in full or on time. The net 
charge-off to loans and leases ratio (ntlnlsr) is an appropriate tool to gauge how risky the 
lending activities of a bank actually are. As a low net charge-off ratio is associated with the bank 
having less bad debt and less charge-offs, and thus a better performance, we expect an inverse 
relationship between operating efficiency and the net charge-offs ratio.   
Hypothesis 4: the higher the net charge-off ratio, the lower the operating efficiency of U.S. 
commercial banks.  
Finally, when the net interest margin (nimy) is expressed as a negative value, it is 
indicative of the bank failing to make an optimal investment decision and this may be due to 
interest expenses exceeding returns generated by investments. On the other hand, a positive 
(nimy) is an indication of efficient investment of funds by the entity. So:  
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Hypothesis 5: Net interest margin for U.S. commercial banks is positively related to operating 
efficiency.  
Based on the regression results of Hypothesis 1, we further expand on that idea by 
looking at the individual impact of Tier II capital ratio on efficiency while controlling for the 
same bank-level characteristics and macroeconomic environment characteristics. Due to the 
supplementary nature of Tier 2 capital, it is not subject to minimum requirements under Basel 
III or any other authority, we expect it to have either a very minimal effect or no effect at all on 
operational efficiency; thus: 
Hypothesis 6: Higher Tier II capital requirements have little to zero impact on bank operating 
efficiency.  
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, a movement of enacting new financial 
regulations and/or improving the existing ones was gaining momentum. Regulators viewed 
stricter capital and leverage requirements under Basel III and the guidelines passed through the 
Dodd Frank Reform as necessary in reshaping the then-ill financial system and establishing and 
enforcing solid grounds for financial stability; thus assisting banks in regaining strength and 
consumer trust. Based on this view:  
Hypothesis 7: Increased capital and leverage requirements in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
improve the operating efficiency of U.S. commercial banks.    
7.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics  
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables utilized to run this study. On average, large U.S. commercial banks, 
with $15 billion or more in consolidated assets have an operating efficiency of 59.31%, as measured by the ratio of bank 
operating expenses to its operating income (same as ratio of bank expenses to its revenues). The minimum operating efficiency 
for the sampled banks is 43% and it was reported by Goldman Sachs Bank in 2008; and the only other negative value of the 
operating efficiency ratio in the sample was reported by Morgan Stanley in the same year. The maximum operating efficiency 
reported is 74% and also reported by Morgan Stanley Private Bank in 2008. These statistics speak directly to the trouble large 
banks in the U.S. were facing in the wake of the crisis in 2008; as a result of their involvement in securitization during the 
subprime mortgage crisis, both GSB and MS, the last two major investment banks in the U.S. suffered during the financial crisis 
and enticed help from the Federal government. On September 2008, they received a massive bailout from the U.S. Department of 
Treasury as part of TARP. More summary statistics results are shown in the main document.  
 
     Variable                 Obs              Mean               Std. Dev.                   Min                      Max 
 
Operating  1,162 .593174 .098151 .4314 .74 
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Efficiency ratio 
Capital  
Adequacy ratio 
1,162 .1123568 .0775716 .0402627 .9489034 
Tier 1 Capital 
ratio 
1,162 .1140532 .0201946 .0898 .1431 
Tier 2 Capital 
ratio 
1,162 .0204015 .01116 .0073977 .0402361 
Common 
Equity 
Capital ratio 
268 .1015179 .0499856 0 .1617 
Leverage ratio 1,162 .0966151 .0685607 .0518 .9495 
Net Charge-
Off ratio 
1,162 .0052543 .0055198 .0001 .0174 
Net Interest 
Margin 
1,162 .0349705 .0156842 -.005 .1423 
Assets 1,162 5.77e+07 6.58e+07 3781333 2.06e+08 
ROA 1,162 .0104044 .0044482 .0032 .0176 
LGDP 1,162 9.58054 .1915247 9.235262 9.87742 
INF 1,162 2.106145 .4553519 1.14 2.74 
                  
 
The standard deviations of eeffr, CAR, rbc1rwaj, T2CR, RBCET1CER, rnc1aaj, ntlnlsr, nimy, and roa are all inferior to 0.1, 
indicating that Tier 1, Tier 2, CET1 capital raios, leverage ratio, profitability, and credit risk are relatively heterogenous among 
the sample, while the standard deviation of assets, LGDP, and INF indicate that the banks in the sample have different sizes, 
different (economic growth?? For LGDP) and are subject to different macroeconomic conditions.   
 
 
This section presents the summary statistics of the variables utilized to run this study as 
shown in Table 2. On average, large U.S. commercial banks, with $15 billion or more in 
consolidated assets have an operating efficiency of 59.31%, as measured by the ratio of bank 
operating expenses to its operating income. The minimum operating efficiency for the sampled 
banks is 43% and it was reported by Goldman Sachs Bank in 2008; and the only other negative 
value of the operating efficiency ratio in the sample was reported by Morgan Stanley within the 
same year. The maximum operating efficiency reported is 74% and is also reported by Morgan 
Stanley Private Bank in 2008. These statistics speak directly to the trouble large banks in the U.S. 
were facing in the wake of the crisis in 2008; as a result of their involvement in securitization 
during the subprime mortgage crisis, both GSB and MS, the last two major investment banks in 
the U.S. suffered during the financial crisis and enticed help from the Federal government. On 
September 2008, they received a massive bailout from the U.S. Department of Treasury as part 
of TARP.  
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As a general rule of thumb, 50% efficiency ratio is the maximum optimal efficiency ratio 
and thus, banks strive for lower efficiency ratios as they are indicative of the bank profitability. 
The efficiency ratio also indicates that the bank is earning more than what it is spending. So, 
having an average of 58.16% operating efficiency ratio speaks volumes to how large U.S. 
commercial banks are technically efficient. That is, on average, the operating expense of any 
bank in our sample comprises 59.31% of its operating income.     
Now that our preliminary descriptive statistics have told us a thing or two about current 
efficiency situation of our sample, let’s shift gears towards bank capital. The descriptive 
statistics also reveal that, on average, large U.S. commercial banks hold a capital adequacy ratio 
of 11.23%, which is well above the 10.5% level established by Basel III. The maximum level of 
capital adequacy reported in Table 2 is 94.89% as reported by Bank of America California in 
2002, while the lowest capital adequacy is recorded at 4.02% by Texas Capital bank in 2012. 
Interestingly, not all large U.S. commercial banks in our sample comply with the Basel III 
capital requirement of a minimum total capital ratio of 10.5%.    
Now, looking at the capital requirements in more depth, under Basel III, the three 
categories of risk-based capital are Common Equity Tier I (CET1) capital and Additional Tier I 
capital; whose sum yields the Tier I capital, and finally the Tier II capital.   
Table 2 shows that banks in our sample maintain 11.40% Tier I core risk-based capital 
ratio (rbc1rwaj) on average; with a maximum of 14.31% and a minimum of 8.98%. The 
minimum requirement on (T1CR) increased from 4% under Basel II to 6% under Basel III, in 
addition to a mandatory 2.5% Capital Conservation Buffer (CCB).    
As far as the Tier II risk-based capital (T2CR) is concerned, banks maintain an average of 
2.04% with a maximum of 4.02% and a minimum of 0.73%. Tier 2 capital is of a minimal 
relevance in comparison to Tier 1 capital, since it only serves as a supplementary capital while 
the latter is more secure and is used to absorb shocks or operational losses the bank may come 
face to face with. 
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Original Basel III rules from 2014 requires banks to fund their activities with 4.5% of 
common equity of risk-weighted assets, up from only 2% in Basel II, thus more than doubling 
this specific requirement. Table 2 shows that sampled banks maintain on average, a 10.15% 
Common Equity Tier I capital requirement, although not all bank comply with this rule, as a 
minimum of 0% is reported; and finally, 16.17% is the maximum CET1 capital requirement 
reported. Because banks were not required to start complying with CET1 until 2014, we only 
have data on CET1 from 2014 and up. CET1 is another capital measure that serves as a 
precautionary tool in protecting not only banks from failure, but also the economy from another 
financial crisis. The 0% reported as a minimum in Table 3 above can be explained away by the 
fact that banks are not expected to fully comply with the CET1 requirement until 2019 when the 
requirement will take full effect, and many of them are in route to 100% compliance.     
Large U.S. commercial banks on average, maintain 9.66% core capital leverage ratio 
(rbc1aaj), which is well above with what is expected of banks to maintain under Basel III. Basel 
III requires U.S. banks to maintain 4% and thus, our sampled banks fully comply with this 
specific leverage ratio requirement. The minimum core capital leverage ratio according to table 
3 is 5.18% while the maximum is 94.95%. 
The mean net charge-offs to loans and leases ratio (ntlnlsr) sits at a very low 0.52% with 
a maximum of 1.74% and a minimum of 0.01%. Looking at the historical values of this ratio, 
especially during the financial crisis, this is a good indication that commercial banks in the U.S. 
have reemerged stronger from the crisis as far as charge-offs and delinquent debt is concerned. 
A lower (ntlnlsr) is associated with less charged-off debt and increased debt management. As 
mentioned earlier, (ntlnlsr) went down from 3.14% in the fourth quarter of 2009 to 0.44% in the 
third quarter of 2017.   
Regarding the net interest margin ratio (nimy), it is between -0.5% and 14.23%, 
averaging 3.49%. The negative minimum net interest margin value is indicative of banks not 
making their optimal investment decisions, since interest expenses far exceed returns generated 
by investments. On the other hand, the positive value of (nimy) indicates that the bank has 
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invested its funds efficiently. The mean of 3.49% indicated that on average, U.S. commercial 
banks have a positive net interest margin and are investing their funds efficiently.     
As far as our control variables are concerned, the return on assets (roa) ratio of large US 
commercial banks is between a minimum of -0.0605 and a maximum of 83.41%, averaging 
1.50%. Return on assets is a common profitability indicator; for banks, a higher (roa) indicates 
more asset efficiency. According the St. Louis Federal Reserve, data on U.S. bank ROAs since 
1984 show an ROA rate hovering around or just above 1%.                      
Finally, (asset) proxies for bank size in this study with a mean of $1.18 trillion; GDP 
averages $14.7425 trillion and this study employs its natural logarithm while inflation, reported 
in percentage points, averages 2.09% with a minimum inflation rate of 0.11% reported in 2008 
and a maximum of 3.73% reported in 2001 over the sampling period of 2000-2017.  
8. Results and Interpretation 
Given the immense importance of bank solvency within any economy, bank capital 
regulation has been regarded as a major tool in not only supervising bank operations, but also 
guaranteeing that banks abide by the general safety rules that lead to a sound banking system.  
To test our hypotheses, we estimate the following regressions using fixed effects 
estimators with robust standard errors, clustered by Bank ID as a measure of controlling for 
heteroskedasticity or correlation between the observations of the same bank across the years in 
the sample. As we know, even with fixed effects, there could a chance that the coefficients we 
are getting may possibly be affected by heteroskedasticity or correlation.  
Table 3: Fixed Effects Regression Results (Capital Adequacy) 
Table 3 represents results of the fixed effects regression. The relationship between bank operating efficiency and capital 
requirements is statistically significant at the 1% significance level. We find that bank regulation in the U.S. in the form of 
regulatory capital requirements is positively related with large commercial banks’ operating efficiency. Holding all other things 
equal, operating efficiency increases by 16.43% for every one unit increase in capital requirements. This is in sync with Thakor 
(1996) findings that increased regulation on capital requirements influence a bank’s decision to alter their internal operating 
strategy on a multitude of levels, as well as with Berger & Bouwman (2013) who find that capital enhances the performance of 
medium and large banks primarily during banking crises. Table 4 also shows that 60.40% of the variance is due to differences 
across panels and a coefficient of determination of 34.08%. More summary statistics results are shown in the main document.  
 
 Operating Efficiency Ratio 
CAR 
0.16a 
(2.65) 
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Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
-0.38a 
(-2.95) 
Tier 2 Capital Ratio 
-0.98b 
(-2.31) 
Total Assets 
-3.68e-11b 
(-2.21) 
ROA 
-10.10 a 
(-9.17) 
GDP 
0.13a 
(4.19) 
INF 
0.12a 
(12.3) 
Adj R2 34% 
Observations 1,162 
(a) Significant at 1%, (b) Significant at 5%, and (c) Significant at 10% 
 
 
 
On Capital Adequacy:  
Table 3 represents results of the fixed effects regression. The relationship between bank 
operating efficiency and capital requirements is statistically significant at the 1% significance 
level. We find that bank regulation in the U.S. in the form of regulatory capital requirements is 
positively related with large commercial banks’ operating efficiency. Holding all other things 
equal, operating efficiency increases by 16.43% for each one unit increase in capital 
requirements. This is in sync with Thakor (1996) findings that increasing regulatory capital 
requirements impacts a bank’s decision to adjust their internal operating strategy accordingly 
and on a multitude of levels, as well as with Berger & Bouwman (2013) who find bank 
performance, especially medium and large ones, to be possibly improved during banking crises. 
Table 3 also shows that 60.40% of the variance is due to differences across panels and a 
coefficient of determination of 34.08% bolsters our results.  
On Tier 1 Capital:  
Next, we go more in depth to decipher the total capital ratio into its sub-components to 
allow for a thorough examination of the individual effect of each sub-category on bank 
operating performance. Table 3 shows that the coefficient of Tier 1 core risk-based capital is 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level; however, it is negatively correlated with 
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bank performance. One possible explanation for this inverse relationship is that rigid capital 
regulation may fire back and cause bank efficiency to deteriorate because it limits opportunities 
for banks to tackle risky projects or imposes constraints on lending activities for fear of potential 
default. Similar to one partial result by Barth et al. (2010), who conclude that placing tough 
control and tight restrictions on the activities of bank may be adversely associated with bank 
efficiency, we conclude that Tier I capital ratio that was increased under Basel III from 4% to a 
minimum requirement of 6% plus another Capital Conservation Buffer of 2% to reach a total of 
8.5% may be too rigid for large bank to the point that it has a negative impact on operating 
efficiency. 
However, since Tier I capital is composed of CET1 capital that is subject to regulatory 
requirements of its own, plus additional Tier I capital, it may be beneficial to look at the 
separated impact of CET1 on operating efficiency as we hypothesized previously.  
On Tier 2 Capital:  
Table 3 shows that Tier 2 capital ratio is negatively and statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level. This inverse relationship between operating efficiency and Tier 2 capital ratio 
may be explained in a different context than the above one. As mentioned before, Tier 2 capital 
is considered less reliable than Tier 1 capital due to the difficulty of its calculation as well as its 
asset composition, and contrary to what we expected in Hypothesis 1, i.e. that Tier 2 capital 
ratio, among other ratios of capital adequacy, increases bank operating efficiency, an inverse 
relationship exists. We then conjecture in Hypothesis 6 that due to the supplementary nature of 
Tier 2 capital, its impact may be minimal and very limited and we run an isolated FE regression 
on Tier 2 capital ratio (T2CR).   
Table 4: Fixed Effects Regression Results (Tier 2 Capital) 
Table 4 confirms the inverse relationship between Tier 2 capital and operating efficiency, showing that it the higher the Tier 2 
capital ratios, the lower the operating efficiency of a bank. We conclude this negative correlation may be due to the 
supplementary nature of Tier 2 capital.  
 
 Operating Efficiency Ratio 
Tier 2 Capital Ratio 
-0.82b 
(-1.99) 
Total Assets 3.46e-11b 
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(-2.09) 
ROA 
-9.94a 
(-9.03) 
GDP 
0.14a 
(4.66) 
INF 
0.12a 
(15.13) 
Adj R2 33% 
Observations 1,162 
                       (a) Significant at 1%, (b) Significant at 5%, and (c) Significant at 10% 
 
 
 
To our expectations this time, empirical findings confirm the inverse relationship, 
showing that the higher the Tier 2 capital ratios, the lower the operating efficiency of a bank.  
On Common Equity Tier 1 Capital (RBCET1):  
According to the capital and liquidity rules under Basel III, all banks must comply with 
a minimum CET1 capital ratio of 4.5% by 2019 plus an additional 2.5% in CCB, bringing the 
CET1 requirement to 7%. As such, CET1 is deemed one of the pillars of total capital of a bank 
since it captures bank solvency that perfectly gauges a bank’s capital strength.  
 
Table 5: Fixed Effects Regression Results (Common Equity Tier 1 Capital) 
Table 5 shows that the common equity requirements in the form of Common Equity Tier 1 capital (CET1) positively impact the 
operating efficiency of large commercial banks. Holding all other things equal, operating efficiency increases by 7.52% for every 
one unit increase in CET1 requirements. Linking the positive impact of CET1 on bank efficiency to the negative impact of Tier 1 
capital, of whom CET1 is a component, may be perplexing. One may wonder if these contradicting effects are born out of Tier 1 
capital having two different components (CET1 and Additional Tier 1 capital), and that the negative effect of the Additional Tier 
1 capital dominates the positive effect of CET1.Table 6 also shows that the coefficient of common equity Tier 1 capital ratio is 
positively and statistically significant at the 1% significance level. All other things equal, a one unit increase in CET1 
requirements leads to a 7.52% increase in a bank’s operational efficiency.  It also shows that 30.04% of the variation in bank 
operating efficiency can be explained by CET1 ratio.   
 
 Operating Efficiency Ratio 
Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio 
0.08a 
(5.06) 
Total Assets 
4.76e-11 
(0.33) 
ROA 
-5.58a 
(-3.50) 
GDP 
-0.26b 
(-2.28) 
INF 
-0.02 
(-0.44) 
40 
 
Adj R2 31% 
Observations 268 
(a) Significant at 1%, (b) Significant at 5%, and (c) Significant at 10% 
 
 
Based on Table 5, the common equity requirements in the form of Common Equity Tier 
1 capital (CET1) positively impacts the operating efficiency of large commercial banks. Holding 
all other things equal, operating efficiency increases by 7.52% for each one unit increase in CET1 
requirements. Linking the positive impact of CET1 on bank efficiency to the negative impact of 
Tier 1 capital, of whom CET1 is a component, may be perplexing. One may wonder if these 
contradicting effects are born out of Tier 1 capital having two different unequally-important 
components (CET1 and Additional Tier 1 capital), and that the negative effect of the Additional 
Tier 1 capital dominates the positive effect of CET1.    
Table 5 shows that the coefficient of common equity Tier 1 capital ratio is positively and 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. All other things equal, a one unit increase in 
CET1 requirements leads to a 7.52% increase in a bank’s operational efficiency.  It also shows 
that 30.04% of the variation in bank operating efficiency can be explained by CET1 ratio.   
On Tier 1 Leverage:  
Under Basel III, leverage ratio (rbc1aaj) is a non-risk-based ratio that U.S. commercial 
banks are expected to maintain equal to or higher than 4%. According to the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), the leverage ratio is a measure that is intended to strengthen the 
risk-based capital requirements.  
Table 6: Fixed Effects Regression Results (Tier 1 Leverage) 
Table 6 shows that leverage requirements positively and significantly impact bank operating efficiency. All other things equal, 
for each unit increase in leverage ratio, operating efficiency increases by 77.49%. We conclude that there is a colossal effect of 
Tier 1 leverage requirements on the operating efficiency of banks.  
 
 
 Operating Efficiency Ratio 
Leverage Ratio 
0.77a 
(2.80) 
Total Assets 
-3.25e-11c 
(-1.91) 
ROA 
-10.14a 
(-9.36) 
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GDP 
0.12a 
(3.14) 
INF 
0.11a 
(9.61) 
Adj R2 34% 
Observations 1,162 
           (a) Significant at 1%, (b) Significant at 5%, and (c) Significant at 10% 
 
 
  
So, based on Table 6, leverage requirements positively and significantly impact bank 
operating efficiency. All other things equal, for each unit increase in leverage ratio, operating 
efficiency increases by 77.49%. We conclude that there is a colossal effect of Tier 1 leverage 
requirements on the operating efficiency of banks.  
On Credit Risk:  
As far as the relationship between bank operating efficiency and credit risk, as proxied 
by net charge-offs to loans ratio (ntlnlsr), Table 7 indicates that its coefficient is a statistically 
significant one at the 1% level of significance, and that a negative or inverse correlation exists 
between bank efficiency and credit risk. As such, any increase in net charge-offs leads to a 
diminished bank operating efficiency. This finding corroborates Lotto (2018) who also detects 
an inverse relationship between bank efficiency and non-performing loans as their proxy for 
credit risk and describes it as “a major finding”.   
Table 7: Fixed Effects Regression Results (Net Charge Offs) 
Table 7 indicates that the coefficient of credit risk, as proxied by net charge-offs to loans ratio (ntlnlsr), is a statistically 
significant one at the 1% level of significance, and that a negative or inverse correlation exists between bank efficiency and credit 
risk. As such, any increase in net charge-offs leads to a diminished bank operating efficiency. This finding corroborates Lotto 
(2018) who also detects an inverse relationship between bank efficiency and non-performing loans as their proxy for credit risk 
and describes it as “a major finding”.  
 
          
 
 Operating Efficiency Ratio 
Net Charge-Off Ratio 
-1.99b 
(-2.27) 
Total Assets 
-2.80e-11c 
(-1.67) 
ROA 
-10.55a 
(-8.72) 
GDP 
0.14a 
(4.57) 
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INF 
0.12a 
(12.50) 
Adj R2 34% 
Observations 1,152 
                      (a) Significant at 1%, (b) Significant at 5%, and (c) Significant at 10% 
  
 
On Net Interest Margin:   
 
Net Interest Margin (nimy) is not a part of the financial regulation requirements ratios. 
However, we made the choice to look at its impact on bank operation efficiency for two reasons. 
First, it is analogous to operating margin for an industrial company and fits right within our 
analysis, and second, it is considered one of the main indicators of financial performance and is 
heavily used in financial analysis. Following Wozniewska (2008), we believe that (nimy) is one 
of the most important bank performance and efficiency indicators and analyzing its dynamics 
allows us to check whether the efficiency improves or deteriorates within a given period of 
time. 
 
  
Table 8: Fixed Effects Regression Results (Net Interest Margin) 
Table 8 shows that the coefficient of Net Interest Margin is statistically significant at the 1% significance level; and that a 
negative correlation exists between (nimy) and bank operating efficiency. To our surprise, we find a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between (nimy) and operating efficiency, i.e. an increase in (nimy) decreases operating efficiency. More 
explanation is found in the main document.   
 
 
 Operating Efficiency Ratio 
Net Interest Margin 
-1.45a 
(-2.66) 
Total Assets  
-1.74e-11c 
(-0.08) 
ROA 
-9.784a 
(-7.16) 
GDP 
0.0047c 
(0.15) 
INF 
0.017a 
(2.57) 
Adj R2 14% 
Observations 1,162 
(a) Significant at 1%, (b) Significant at 5%, and (c) Significant at 10% 
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Results show that the coefficient of Net Interest Margin is statistically significant at the 
1% significance level; and that a negative correlation exists between (nimy) and bank operating 
efficiency. To our surprise, we find a negative and statistically significant relationship between 
(nimy) and operating efficiency, i.e. an increase in (nimy) decreases operating efficiency.   
On Before and After-Crisis Impact:    
Table 9: Fixed Effects Regression Results: Before and After the Crisis Analysis   
Table 9 shows results a positive and significant correlation between the efficiency of U.S. commercial banks and financial 
regulation in the wake of the financial crisis. All in all, holding other things equal, bank operating efficiency in the U.S. increases 
by 16.80% for each one unit increase in financial regulation post crisis. Interestingly, results indicate that financial regulation pre-
crisis is negatively and significantly correlated with bank operating efficiency; with a decline in operating bank efficiency of 
about 7.52% for each additional one unit increase in financial regulation pre-crisis; which may be explained by the fact that 
capital and leverage requirements pre-crisis were not sufficient to guarantee safe banking operations and caused the operating 
efficiency to deteriorate.  
 
 Operating Efficiency Ratio 
CAR 
0.16a 
(2.65) 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
-0.38a 
(-2.95) 
Tier 2 Capital Ratio 
-0.98b 
(-2.31) 
 
Before Crisis 
-0.0752704b   
(-1.96)  
After Crisis 
0.1680941a    
(5.21) 
Total Assets 
-3.68e-11b 
(-2.21) 
ROA 
-10.10 a 
(-9.17) 
GDP 
0.13a 
(4.19) 
INF 
0.12a 
(12.3) 
Adj R2 33.23% 
Observations 1,162 
(a) Significant at 1%, (b) Significant at 5%, and (c) Significant at 10% 
 
  
To capture the possible impact of increased capital and leverage requirements on U.S. 
commercial banks in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, we compare the effect of 
financial regulation on bank efficiency prior to and post crisis. We assign a dummy variable to 
account for the “Before Crisis” period, taking the value of 1 for years 2000 through 2006 and 
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zero otherwise. We also assign a “After Crisis” dummy variable to account for the post-crisis 
era, taking the value of 1 for years 2010 through 2017 and zero otherwise.  
Confirming our hypothesis 7, Table 9 results detect a positive and significant correlation 
between the efficiency of U.S. commercial banks and financial regulation in the wake of the 
financial crisis. All in all, holding all other things equal, bank operating efficiency in the U.S. 
increases by 16.80% for each one unit increase in financial regulation post crisis. Interestingly, 
results indicate that financial regulation pre-crisis is negatively and significantly correlated with 
bank operating efficiency, with a decline in operating bank efficiency of about 7.52% for each 
additional one unit increase in financial regulation pre-crisis; which may be explained by the 
fact that capital and leverage requirements pre-crisis were not sufficient to guarantee safe 
banking operations and caused the operating efficiency to deteriorate.  
9.  Findings 
Our goal is to examine the multi-faceted impact of financial regulation on the operating 
efficiency of large U.S. commercial banks. In Table 3, we regress the operational efficiency on 
the capital adequacy ratio and the two major components of total capital, Tier 1 capital ratio 
(rbc1rwaj) and Tier 2 capital ratio (T2CR) while controlling for bank characteristics and 
macroeconomic environment characteristics. We find the capital adequacy coefficient to be 
statistically significant and positive, indicating that increased regulation improves a bank’s 
operational efficiency and confirming Hypothesis 1. Our results are similar to Thakor (1996) 
who claims that imposing tight controls on banks in the form of elevated capital requirements 
influences a bank’s decision to alter their internal operating strategy on a multitude of levels, as 
well as with Berger & Bouwman (2013) who conclude a positive correlation between capital and 
bank performance.   
The negative sign of the coefficient of Tier 1 capital ratio is unexpected due to the 
relevance of Tier 1 capital in sustaining bank losses. We provide a possible explanation saying 
that stringent capital regulation may sometimes counter-attack a bank’s efficiency, causing it to 
deteriorate as it limits opportunities for high-risk, high-return investments, or by imposing 
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constraints on its lending practices. Similarly, Barth et al. (2010) conclude that restricting bank 
activities leads to lower levels of bank efficiency. We then conclude that Tier I capital ratio that 
received a special attention under Basel III, through more than doubling it from 4% to 8.5% may 
be too rigid for large bank, especially in the light of the fierce resistance of banks to increasing 
capital requirements and calls for relaxing them. We also suspect that this negative correlation 
may be explained by the fact that Tier I capital is composed of CET1 capital that is subject to 
regulatory requirements of its own, plus additional Tier I capital.  
As far as the Tier 2 Capital is concerned, empirical findings from Table 3 show that Tier 
2 capital ratio is also negatively and statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The 
negative sign of the coefficient of T2CR however is expected, as in Hypothesis 6, where we 
conjecture that due to its supplementary nature, higher Tier 2 capital requirements have little to 
zero impact on bank operating efficiency. To our expectation this time, the inverse relationship 
between operating efficiency and Tier 2 capital ratio is confirmed through the empirical results 
from Table 4, and we conclude that since Tier 2 capital is considered less reliable than Tier 1 
capital due to the difficulty of its calculation as well as its asset composition, it impeded 
operating efficiency by making the bank subject to unnecessary additional capital requirements.  
In Table 5, we report fixed effects regression results with common equity Tier 1 capital 
as the sole independent variable while controlling for the same bank-level and macroeconomic-
level control variable. To our expectation in Hypothesis 2, i.e. higher CET1 capital requirements 
are a positively correlated to bank operating efficiency, we find that the sign of the (CET1) 
coefficient is positively and statistically significant at the 1% significance level, proving that 
Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio (CET1) positively impacts the operating efficiency of large 
commercial banks. This positive correlation helps us shed some light on the negative impact of 
Tier 1 capital, of which CET1 is a component. Due to Tier 1 capital having being composed of 
two different components (CET1) and Additional Tier 1 capital, and given that we detected a 
positive impact of capital adequacy on efficiency, it may be possible that the impact of (CET1) is 
dominant and helps explain the positive correlation between capital adequacy and operational 
efficiency. Note that capital adequacy in this study is proxied by (CAR), which is defined as the 
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ratio of the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capitals to risk-weighted assets, which makes CET1 a part 
of (CAR) in the process.  
We then present the results of regressing operational efficiency on core capital leverage 
requirements as proxied by the Tier 1 leverage ratio. Table 6 shows that Tier 1 leverage 
requirements positively and significantly impact bank operating efficiency, a result that 
confirms our Hypothesis 3 that higher leverage requirements positively impact U.S. commercial 
banks and savings institutions’ operating efficiency. This finding bolsters the importance of the 
leverage requirements as they are also subject to regulation under Basel III and commercial 
banks are required to comply with them.    
In Table 7, we report the results of regressing operational efficiency on credit risk. We 
find that the coefficient of credit risk, as proxied by net charge-offs to loans ratio (ntlnlsr), is a 
statistically significant one at the 1% significance level, and that an inverse correlation exists 
between bank efficiency and credit risk, indicating that any increase in net charge-offs leads to a 
diminished bank operating efficiency. This finding is expected through Hypothesis 4 and 
corroborates the findings of Lotto (2018) who also finds an inverse relationship between bank 
efficiency and credit risk in commercial banks in Tanzania.  
Moreover, we examine the impact of net interest margin (nimy) on operational efficiency 
and the results are reported in Table 9. Results show that the coefficient of (nimy) is statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level; and that a negative correlation exists between (nimy) 
and bank operating efficiency. This negative correlation is unexpected since in hypothesis 5, we 
expect net interest margin for U.S. commercial banks to be positively related to operating 
efficiency. 
Although (nimy) is not a part of the financial regulation requirements ratios; however, it 
remains one of the most commonly used profitability ratios in financial analysis. An 
explanation may be found in a recent statement of Chris Vanderpool, Senior Analyst at S&P 
Global Market Intelligence who claims that in spite of positive prospects about the banking 
industry in the fact that it seems healthy, banks across the board are well-capitalized, and credit 
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quality is strong; loan growth has been sluggish and profit margins are compressed. It is true 
that banks in the U.S. have been through a long recovery road and are healthier than they have 
been in a decade (Forbes, 2017), there are still hurdles to be overcome just as those mentioned 
above, which could explain the negative relationship between net interest margin and operating 
efficiency.  
Another possible explanation for the negative correlation we uncovered between net 
interest margin and operating efficiency may be found in a recent study by Forbes on America’s 
100 Best Banks. This is a study that aims to gauge the financial conditions of the U.S. largest 
banks, ranking them based on ten metrics related to capital adequacy, profitability, asset 
quality, and growth. Surprisingly, the 2017 ranking produces shocking results in that none of 
the big four banks in the U.S. landed in the top 50 of America’s Best Banks, and the first factor 
that Forbes study blames this on is “low net interest margins”, then “high levels of net charge-
offs as a percent of loans and leases, and weak revenue growth.” 11  
Finally, financial regulation efforts in the wake of the financial crisis bolster our initial 
claims of a positive association between the operating efficiency of U.S. commercial banks and 
the body of financial regulation enacted through increased regulatory capital and leverage rules 
and requirements. Unfortunately, financial regulatory efforts pre-crisis are found to have had a 
negative impact on the operating efficiency of U.S. commercial banks; fueling the view that the 
level of regulatory capital during the years leading to the financial crisis was frail and 
inadequate to maintain bank solvency and guarantee sound banking operations.  
9.1.  Policy Implications:  
As Claessens & Kodres (2014) claim, the financial system and economies has long 
suffered from damage, and policymakers have attempted to remedy this damage through the 
enactment of a large set of financial reforms, both at the international and domestic level. A part 
of doing so was creating of FRB in 2009 and passing Basel III in 2010. This study examines, 
among other, the effect of specific requirements under Basel III. Our empirical findings indicate 
                                                          
11 visit: https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2017/01/10/full-list-ranking-americas-100-largest-banks/#1a902a9d4c5a 
for the Forbes 2017 Ranking America’s Best 100 Banks. 
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that capital adequacy should be every large bank’s major concern as it is an essential 
determinant of its operating efficiency. Our results speak in favor of well-capitalization 
practices, and lend support to those authorities enforcing regulation, through increasing capital 
and leverage requirements. We believe that such regulatory requirements genuinely serve the 
purpose of strengthening bank supervision and help establish guardrails against the unforeseen 
risk of future financial crises. We also hope that policymakers keep those requirements in place 
in spite of increasing pressures from banks and a heightened movement of resisting higher 
capital requirements or demanding its immediate relaxing. Needless to mention how the recent 
financial crisis has erupted and what type of corrective actions and measures it took to steer the 
financial system in the U.S. back to safety. We are sure that a lesson or two have been learned.    
10. Conclusion  
In what seems to be a long and slow route to recovery, rigorous bank and financial 
regulatory acts are still needed to rectify flaws of the financial system, yet at the same time, 
there are calls to soften bank sector regulation to boost commercial banking, while promoting 
investment and lending activities.  
This paper tackles what we believe to be one of the hottest topics within the financial 
system nowadays, i.e. whether financial regulation benefits banks or impede their operations 
instead. We closely examine 68 of the largest commercial banks in the U.S. with $15 billion or 
more in consolidated assets that meet specific criteria. After controlling for bank-level 
characteristics and macro-economic environment control variables, we regress operating 
efficiency on a handful of explanatory variables, such as the basic capital and leverage 
requirement ratios, a credit risk proxy, and a common profitability and financial soundness 
measure. We find that one unit increase in the capital adequacy ratio increases operating 
efficiency by 16.43% for large U.S. commercial banks; that operating efficiency increases by 
7.52% for every single unit increase in CET1 requirements, and that for each unit increase in 
leverage ratio, operating efficiency increases by 77.49%. Our empirical findings contribute to 
studies closely examining the impact of regulation on bank efficiency by deciphering the 
individual impacts of each component. 
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In brief, we uncover the relevance of capital adequacy, credit risk management, and 
leverage requirement in promoting large banks’ operating efficiency in the U.S., a necessary 
requirement to sustain a healthy financial climate overall. Our findings corroborate those of 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine (2004) that bank supervision matters and are supported by 
findings of Myers and Majluf (1984) that a positive relation exists between bank performance 
and capital ratio, the latter being another proxy for capital adequacy.   
As far as the direction of future research goes, given that the full compliance with the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) has not been established till January 2017, very little data exist 
(2017-2018) since banks have only started disclosing their liquidity coverage requirement ratios 
recently. LCR has an undeniable promising role in banking regulation, and future research may 
be directed towards uncovering its impact on bank operating efficiency. Only then, the full 
impact of all three categories of financial regulation under Basel III can be assessed and 
conclusions could be made about its holistic effect in improving bank performance or setting it 
back.     
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CHAPTER 2 
 
The Determinants of Sovereign Debt Issuance Choice: Sukuk Vs Conventional Bonds  
 
1. Introduction and Motivation 
There is a large need for debt financing by both corporations and governments, and 
while corporate debt financing has been extensively covered in the literature, through its two 
major components, conventional bonds and Sukuk, there are only shy attempts of approaching 
government debt financing with its two distinct categories, sovereign conventional bond 
issuance and sovereign Islamic Sukuk issuance.    
Financing through the issuance of debt is classified as a major source for organizations 
and central governments to obtain external funds. Today, debt issuance originates from two 
main sources: conventional bonds and Sukuk. Sukuk are Islamic bonds that combine features of 
stocks and conventional bonds altogether. They are regarded as an alternative instrument of 
conventional bond in the financial market and have gained massive notoriety over the last two 
decades (Haque et al. 2017).  
In the beginning, the primary Sukuk market had started relatively small, totaling at 
about USD 134 million in 2000. However, it considerably expanded from 2001 going forward, 
with the primary market volume in 2016 being USD 88.3 billion (IIFM report, 2017) and recently 
increasing to USD 116.7 billion in 2017 (IIFM report, 2018). This market is basically deeply 
rooted in emerging countries, mainly members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC) although Western countries in the caliber of UK and Luxembourg ventured into this 
market through issuing sovereign Sukuk in 2014. Indeed, sovereign Sukuk, a type of Sukuk 
issues by national governments, represent more than 55% of the Sukuk market. By the end of 
2016, the total sovereign Sukuk issued raised to USD 472 billion (IIFM report, 2017). 
Due to the remarkable expansion of the Sukuk market in the few recent years, 
considerable research has been devoted to uncovering the reasons behind it; however, the 
majority of those studies emphasize the determinants of corporate Sukuk market development 
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(Said and Grassa, 2013, Azmat et al. 2014; Mohamed et al. 2015, Nagano, 2016 and 2017, and 
Klein and Weill, 2016). Corporate Sukuk issuance is largely attributed to external and internal 
factors (Grigorian, 2003); could be adversely affected by poor credit rating and political 
instability (Thomas, 2009); and that access to credit markets is determined by country size 
(Gelos et al., 2011). Moreover, specific characteristics of Sukuk coupled with the issuer’s 
characteristics could potentially determine the choice between issuing Islamic or conventional 
bonds (Grassa and Miniaoui, 2017).    
To our knowledge, the topic of determinants of choice between sovereign Sukuk and 
sovereign bonds has never been investigated before. We therefore capitalize on the lack of 
studies dedicated to investigating the dynamics of sovereign debt issuance by looking at not 
only conventional debt issue through sovereign bonds, but also Islamic debt issue through 
sovereign Sukuk, a growing Islamic finance instrument, thus contributing to the growing 
literature on Sukuk as well. Our research intends to investigate the determinants of sovereign 
Sukuk issuance that have recently contributed to the development of Sukuk market. Here, we 
provide empirical evidence that countries choose to issue Sukuk in ways consistent with 
economic and finance theories.    
The focal point of this paper is on answering the following question: What are the 
significant determinants for sovereign debt issuer, i.e. a national government, to choose among 
conventional bond and Sukuk issuance?    
Sovereign or government debt refers to how much a country owes to outside creditor 
and could be used interchangeably with public debt. Central governments usually issue 
sovereign or national debt as a measure of financing their growth and development projects, 
while relying on their stability and sovereign credit ratings to attract investors seeking 
sovereign debt investments.    
As sovereign debt arises as a result of accumulated annual deficits, historically, 
governments have been employing a myriad of channels to finance their projects and raise 
funding. This took place through either directly borrowing from banks, institutions, individuals 
55 
 
or countries, or issuing Treasury bonds, bills, or notes. Governments of OIC countries in specific 
rely on different debt instruments or tools to meet their foreign debt needs.  
Nowadays, sovereign debt is an important cornerstone of many institutional investment 
portfolios and is considered among the safest investments in most countries. Sovereign bonds 
are particularly safer than most of the other alternatives since countries strive to keep an access 
to credit markets in the future and make it a high priority to pay back debt and avoid defaulting 
altogether. This leads to governments carefully assessing the risks associated with issuing 
sovereign debts, knowing that defaulting on sovereign debts will stripe countries of any chance 
of obtaining loans in the future or getting loans with favorable conditions and interest rates.    
A default also renders the defaulting country less creditworthy and forces it to fulfill its 
borrowing needs directly from world organizations such as the World Bank for instance. 
Borrowing from such international financial institutions often comes with a higher cost and is 
coupled with unfavorable interest rates and conditions.  In brief, although alternative methods 
of financing projects are available for central governments, such as raising taxes, reducing 
spending, or printing more money, borrowing remains one of the favorable solutions given the 
fact that governments will always be investing in new growth and development projects. 
Hence, there will always likely be a rising demand for debt financing as a main venue of 
funding for national governments.   
This study uses a sample of 745 sovereign debts issued - consisting of 602 sovereign 
bonds and 143 sovereign Sukuk- from 1995 to 2015 in 16 OIC countries (namely: Algeria, 
Bahrain, Brunei Dar Al Salam, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Egypt, Malaysia, Morocco, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and UAE). Our findings provide evidence that issued 
sovereign Sukuk are larger in size than the issued bonds and have longer maturities. Hence, 
sovereign bonds issues are smaller in size and require higher margins to cover the potential risk 
involved. Moreover, we provide evidence that countries with developed financial markets, 
stronger economic indicators, higher credit quality, and stronger financial positions, are more 
likely to issue sovereign Sukuk rather than conventional bonds. This preference tends to fuel 
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the issuing countries’ strategy of diversification and development of their current financial 
markets with the promotion of new debt tools.  
Conversely, countries with weaker economics and financial positions are more likely to 
opt for the traditional sovereign bond issuance. This preference towards classic debt tools is 
justified by those countries’ non-readiness to venture into new sophisticated debt markets or 
unwillingness to develop their traditional financial tools by trying on new debt tools such as 
Sukuk for example.     
Our analysis borrows from different strands of the literature on sovereign debt, helping 
us to contribute to the literature on a myriad of levels. First, given the unique and distinct 
features of conventional bonds versus Islamic Sukuk, we enrich the literature by presenting 
evidence on how the factors determining issuance for sovereign Sukuk and conventional debt 
may sometimes share similarities, but are also different on many other levels. Second, by 
comparing sovereign bonds with sovereign Sukuks’ characteristics in the context of 16 OIC 
countries, this study is an attempt to execute a comparative analysis on a government's issuance 
motives as well as to assess what determines the issuers' specific preferences for sovereign 
Sukuk. Third, to the best of our knowledge, we believe this is the first study that examines the 
association between credit quality and the choice between issuing sovereign Sukuk or bonds; 
given that a large body of literature is devoted to exploring the correlation between credit 
quality and the choice between public and private debt. Finally, we hope to add to the ongoing 
policy debate on the choice of government’s debt by linking our empirical findings to real world 
practices to assist policymakers.    
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing 
literature on Sukuk market. Section 3 describes data and methodology. Section 5 discusses 
regression results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review     
The literature on the determinants of choice of debt identifies an alarming stream of 
mixed results as reported by empirical studies exploring this phenomenon. Findings of 
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Grigorian (2003) suggests the importance of both external and internal factors. In a study that 
covers first-time and subsequent issues by emerging economies spanning 1980 through 2002, 
Grigorian identifies factors such as a favorable fiscal position, low levels of inflation and high 
levels of GDP per capita, as being the catalyst in deciding the type of issue. Additional factors 
were identified by Thomas (2009) who claims that during the period of 1970–2006, low-income 
developing countries could not easily access international capital markets due to internal factors 
such as poor credit quality, in addition to external factors such as political instability.   
In a study that examines a sample of 150 emerging economies spanning 1980 through 
2000, Gelos et al. (2011) single out market access as a determinant of choice between sovereign 
bond issues or borrowing through private syndicated bank loans. They show that the economic 
size and prosperity of a country determine its access to credit market in that countries with 
larger and developed economies find it an easy task to access international credit markets, but it 
is also the institutional quality of its organizations that drives that market access. While 
countries with bright financial and economic prospects have an easy access to international 
credit markets, countries that are more vulnerable to shocks have a hard time tapping into those 
markets.    
Similarly, findings of Presbitero et al. (2016) suggest that factors such as large economic 
size, higher GDP per capita, lower public debt, and a highly effective government, play a major 
role in increasing a country’s probability of issuing bonds, as compared to non-issuing 
counterparts. On a global factor level, their results confirm previous evidence of the higher 
likelihood of issuances being associated with periods of global liquidity and higher commodity 
prices.  
While the bulk of empirical studies highlight conventional finance and focus on 
developed capital markets, there exist certain recent evidences that differentiate between the 
two main channels of issuing debt, i.e. Sukuk and conventional bonds. Furthermore, the 
majority of those studies focus on corporate level. For instance, Nagano’s (2017) suggest that 
choosing Sukuk issuance depends on the accessibility to the Sukuk market; which is a necessary 
condition that needs to be met before other determinants could promote the use of Sukuk. 
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Moreover, once the issuer has full access to the Sukuk market, Sukuk issuance is promoted by 
the low degree of financial constraints on a firm, and the level of a firm’s undervaluation in the 
pre-issuance period.  
Taken together, there seems to be a pronounced preference for the Sukuk issuance along 
with market timing, given that the pecking-order conditions of market accessibility are first 
satisfied. Klein and Weil (2015) present evidence that information asymmetries and adverse 
selection impact the choice of the Sukuk market. Godlewski et al. (2013) study how stock 
market investors react during the days following Sukuk issuance in Malaysia only to detect a 
negative market reaction following a sukuk issuance event; which is indicative of Sukuk having 
a negative signal for the Sukuk-issuing firm. Sukuk appear to exacerbate the information 
asymmetries inherent in a debt market and to be exposed to both moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems, due to the nature of its structuring.  
In a subsequent study to further investigate the negative market reaction, Godlewski, 
Turk-Ariss, and in an attempt to further investigate this troublesome negative reaction, Weill 
(2016) closely inspect how Sharia board may influence the stock market reaction following 
sukuk issuance. Using a sample of sukuk from eight different countries, they find that a Sukuk 
should have been approved by a religious committee before its issuance; the committee 
scrutinizes its conformity and full compliance with the Islamic law (the Sharia). They find that 
the choice of Sharia scholars is crucial to how shareholders react to the issuance; they conclude 
that Sukuk are subject to an unseen Sharia-compliance risk that conventional bonds are not 
subject to, and this exacerbates the differences between Sukuk and conventional bonds.  
Azmat et al. (2014) suggest that there is very little commonality between Islamic 
partnership-based bonds and equity and dissimilar to conventional bonds, the issuer’s stock 
valuation has no impact on debt–equity targets associated with bond issuance from Islamic joint 
venture. Their findings also suggest that bond's security and seniority should be the major focus 
of bond issuers in lieu of their Islamic structure. Moreover, they find that security against real 
asset bonds is not necessarily representative of ownership of the underlying asset.  
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Findings of Mohamed et al.’s (2015) lend support to the trade-off theory conveyed 
through the optimizing behavior of firms among issuers of Sukuk and conventional bonds 
although with different issuance motives; they suggest it is chosen when firms are faced with 
higher information asymmetry costs. In addition, their findings support that the pecking order 
theory is implemented by issuers of partnership-based Sukuk and convertible bonds. They also 
propose that although straight bond issuers and exchange-based Sukuk may share the same 
goal or target, the trade-off view remains the choice of firms that enjoy higher sales growth.  
All in all, most of previous cited works concentrate on corporate choice of debt between 
sovereign Sukuk and conventional bonds. However, we believe that this is the first study to 
ever investigate what truly determines the government choice of debt between sovereign Sukuk 
and sovereign bonds. We therefore contribute to the growing literature on Sukuk market by 
extending previous few empirical works and approaching a pristine research area.      
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data 
We investigate the sovereign Sukuk and bond market in 16 Muslim countries namely: 
Algeria, Bahrain, Brunei Dar Al Salam, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Egypt, Malaysia, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and UAE, with issuances from 1995 to 2015 
(See Table 1). The main source of data is the Zawya Database, a section of Thomson Reuters 
Middle East and a reliable source of regional news, intelligence, company databases, and 
information on the latest projects from across the MENA region. We employ the Zawya 
database since it provides data on bond and Sukuk issuances alike, the size of the issuance, 
specific issuance year, tenor, credit rating of the security, and issuance date.    
Then, we match the sovereign conventional bond and Sukuk issuances with the issuing 
country’s economic and financial characteristics within the same year following Grassa and 
Miniaoui (2017). We match the issue of each country, given the year of issuance spanning from 
1995 till 2015 with its corresponding macroeconomic indicators (economic size and growth, 
interest rate, inflation rate, finance debt, and cumulative finance debt) in addition to financial 
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characteristics (the size of Islamic banking system, financial market size, capital market size, 
financial market development indicator, institutional indicator, institutional reserves, and 
country credit rating) (see Table 3). This information was collected from multiple sources such 
the Global Competitiveness Reports published by the IMF; and the World Bank’s Global 
Development Finance (GDF) Database.  
Moreover, we have used the Zawya Database to construct data on simultaneous and 
previous issuance of sovereign Sukuk and bonds; and collected historical data on our 
participating countries in terms of any previous sovereign default they have ever experienced.  
As a part of investigating the determinants of government debt choice between 
sovereign bonds and Sukuk issuances, and to stay true to the comparative analysis between 
sovereign conventional bonds and Sukuk, we have chosen to remove those bond issuances 
characterized by being hybrid from our analysis (asset-backed bonds and convertibles), while 
including all Sukuk types.     
We obtain an unbalanced panel of data, given the fact that countries in our sample have 
distinctive issues of either sovereign conventional bonds or Sukuk throughout the sampling 
period. Our final sample contains a total of 745 issuances made by 16 countries over the period 
1995-2015; of which sovereign Sukuk represent 18.4% of the sample in terms of issues, making 
the total amount of sovereign bond issued substantially inferior to the amount of sovereign 
bonds. Table 10 presents the types of issuance per year. 
Table 10: Sample Distribution of Issues by Year   
  Bonds Sukuk 
1995 3 0 
1996 3 0 
1997 4 0 
1998 6 0 
1999 3 0 
2000 5 0 
2001 4 0 
2002 4 1 
2003 8 1 
2004 4 1 
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2005 7 4 
2006 12 4 
2007 7 2 
2008 18 1 
2009 21 4 
2010 22 5 
2011 25 7 
2012 45 19 
2013 113 25 
2014 157 30 
2015 131 39 
Total 602 143 
 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 displays the descriptive characteristics of the sovereign Sukuk and bond 
issuances. We observe that on average, sovereign Sukuk are larger compared to sovereign 
bonds. Additionally, the average margin of the sovereign bonds is higher than what observed in 
sovereign Sukuk. However, the median maturity of sovereign debt is considerably and 
substantially longer for sovereign Sukuk issuances.     
There results indicate that both sovereign Sukuk and conventional bonds markets may 
be highly differentiated; which is naturally inherited from the fact that governments have 
different needs for financing. Results also show that the market is strongly segmented, with 
sovereign bond issuers dominating in issuance size, as compared to their Sukuk issuing 
counterparts. This may be linked to the potential view that it is the economic and financial 
underlying circumstances within issuing countries that mandate the type of issuance.  
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics by Issuance Type   
Table 11 provides the major summary statistics of our data: the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum of Islamic and conventional bond issuances in the sample. The amount of issues is represented in USD 
millions and the maturity is expressed in number of years. 
  
Sovereign Conventional Bonds:  
 
Variable Mean      Median St. Dev.  Min Max 
Size 18.81508 18.47831 
 
1.568661 13.12835 22.39722 
Margin  6.066744 .05254 3.598922 .473 17 
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Tenor 6.462063 5 5.602524 1 30 
Previous Issue .1143847 0 .3185542 0 1 
Simultaneous 
Issue 
.0833333 0 .2766256 0 1 
Sovereign default .4540728 0 .4983182 0 1 
Regulation 3.918216 3.9 .551655 2.4 5.2 
Institutional 
Quality  
4.30048 4.4 .703654 2.657816 
 
5.945494 
Institutional 
Reserves 
8.53e+08 9.31e+08 2.91e+09 -5.79e+0 5.04e+09 
Finance Debt  62.94988 66.82353 15.74261 1.900876 85.78853 
Cumulative 
Finance Debt 
194115 86093 232561.3 0 795741 
Credit Rating 6.095486 5 1.518436 5 9 
GDP 1.13e+11 5.57e+10 1.05e+11 1.982548 
 
6.72e+11 
Interest Rates 4.381698 4.716667 1.060882 1.6425 
 
5.741667 
INF 4.474513 3.271702 3.119531 
 
.5833084 10.1458 
GDP Per Capita 10513.79 3976.966 12651.16 2653.899 38184.86 
Islamic Finance 
Size  
10.07911 9.625743 7.837695 
 
1.794681 29.67921 
Fin. Mkt Size 66.48266 71.32864 31.5326 6.925822 179.0929 
Capital Market 
Size 
57.55331 67.63248 25.48456 8.350541 156.2479 
 
 
 Sovereign Sukuk:  
 
  
Variable Mean      Median St. Dev.  Min Max 
Size 19.79941      20.29248    
 
1.194095    17.12075    21.37686   
Margin  4.149453      . 03899    1.653025         .18         11.25 
Tenor 7.23209     6.75  5.985642          .2          34  
Previous Issue .9323308       1  .252127           0 1 
Simultaneous 
Issue 
.2932331     0 .4569655           0 1 
Sovereign default  0 0 0 0 1 
Regulation 5.197222      5.2 .3667874          4.3         5.6  
Institutional 
Quality  
5.140226        5.1   .33627    4.526371    5.945494  
Institutional 
Reserves 
  -5.72e+08       -6.58e+08 4.60e+09   -5.79e+09     5.04e+09   
Finance Debt  49.64918     52.67475 10.04901           0  54.49153  
Cumulative 
Finance Debt 
354400   460718 197318.9             946 548990  
Credit Rating 8.164179   8 .6276107  7 10 
GDP 2.72e+11      2.97e+11 1.34e+11    
  
1.44e+10     
 
6.50e+11  
Interest Rates 2.414635      1.805  1.073426       1.6425    5.741667  
INF 2.425594     2.097  .8610653    
 
.5833084     5.440782  
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GDP Per Capita 17512.99      10878.39    10861.29    8236.022     38184.86  
Islamic Finance 
Size  
12.8957      11.08931    10.42141    1.794681     29.67921  
Financial Market 
Size 
118.6687     129.2603   30.54438    35.53503     168.0671  
Capital Market 
Size 
109.8746        129.008   36.35128    
  
26.08485    147.9527  
 
 
 
3.3 Methodology and Hypotheses Development 
As part of investigating the determinants of sovereign Sukuk or bond choice, we have 
chosen to employ a specific econometric technique for dynamic panel data models (DPD) in this 
research since it features characteristics of both time series and cross-sectional data. For similar 
studies, the literature shows a tendency of using the Probit model as advanced by Greene (2003) 
and Kumar et al. (2010) and based on a binary outcome dependent variable where the predicted 
probabilities are limited between 0 and 1. In fact, since the Probit model specifies a binary 
response model, it is perfect for establishing a link between the discrete variable and its 
determinants. However, in modeling techniques involving the Probit model, the latter may 
suffer from unobserved heterogeneity and/or endogeneity flaws. Moreover, traditional 
techniques have been widely used in a myriad of previous studies, such as the two-stage 
procedure (2SLS) destined to estimate the partial adjustment model of debt (Fama and French, 
2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003; and Byoun, 2008).    
However, critics for the former econometric techniques have emerged, blaming them for 
producing biased estimates in dynamic panel data models, especially when panel lengths are 
short or when individual firm fixed-effects are present (Laisney and Lechner, 2003, Lemmon et 
al., 2008, Baltagi, 2008, and Huang and Ritter, 2009).   
Therefore, in this study, we adopt the largely popular Logit model in analyzing the 
binary outcome dependent variable, i.e., governments’ choice of sovereign debt. The Logit 
model is a binary outcome model that has a different functional form than the Probit model. 
Binary models are among the most popular in applied economics and the model estimates the 
probability that Y, the dependent variable, is a binary outcome, with Y = 1 as a function of the 
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explanatory variables. In the logit model, we model the probability of Y equal 1, so instead of 
modeling the value of Y itself, we are modeling the probability that Y would be taking the value 
of 1, and in this case, we identify the government choice of debt to be the issuance of sovereign 
Sukuk when Y=1.    
    Y =  The government’s choice of sovereign debt as: 
Y =    1 if the choice of debt is sovereign Sukuk 
                              0 if the choice of debt is sovereign conventional bonds. 
      
We conjecture that the government's choice of sovereign debt is determined by four 
major categories of variables:  
- Specific Issue Characteristics  
- Country’s Macroeconomic Indicators, i.e. Economic Characteristics 
- Country’s Financial Development Indicators, i.e. Financial Characteristics 
- Specific Events  
Table 12: Data Sources 
Variables Measured by Source 
 
Issue Characteristics 
  
Issuance Size (Size) Log of total amount issued Zawya database 
Issuance Tenor (Tenor) Number of years Zawya database 
Margin (Margin) Margin percentage Zawya database 
   
Macroeconomic Indicators   
Economic size ( GDP ) GDP at purchasing power 
parity (EC size)/  
Population (POP) 
World Bank 
Interest rates (INTER) Interest rate spread(lending 
rate minus LIBOR) 
 
World Bank 
Inflation (INF) Inflation Rate World Bank 
The economic growth 
(GDP per capita) 
 GDP per capita World Bank 
Finance Debt  (FDEBT)                                         Central government debt to World Bank                  
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GDP (%) 
Cumulative Finance Debt     
(Cumulative F. D.)                   
Equal to total finance debt in 
the last 3 years   
World Bank                  
   
 
 
Financial Development 
Indicators 
  
Islamic banking system size 
(IFSIZE) 
Islamic financial assets to 
GDP 
Grassa and Gazdar (2013) 
Financial Market size 
(FINMART) 
Financial system deposits to 
GDP (%) 
World Bank 
 
 
Capital market capitalization 
(CAPMART) 
Stock market World Bank 
Regulation Financial market development 
indicator score (1-7) 
World Competitiveness 
Report 
 
Institutional Quality the Institutions Indicator (a 
score of 1-7)  
 
  World Competitiveness 
Report 
 
Institutional Reserves (months of imports) World Bank 
Country credit rating  Rating S&P Rating Agency 
Events 
  
Previous Sukuk Issuance Dummy variable equals 1 
when the government i has 
experienced Sukuk issuance 
in the past 3 years and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Zawya Database 
Simultaneous Issuance   Dummy variable equals to 1 if 
the government has issued 
both sukuk and conventional 
bond in the same year. 
Zawya Database 
Sovereign Default 
 
Dummy variable equals 1 if 
the government has 
experienced a default and 0 
otherwise. 
 
World Bank 
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Table 12 establishes the guidelines for our data variables and their respective sources. 
We identify four distinct categories as possible determinants of a government’s choice of 
sovereign debt (Specific issue characteristics, the country’s macroeconomic indicators, the 
country’s financial development indicators; in addition to specific Events).   
As far as issue characteristics are concerned, a government’s issue size is measured by 
the log of total amount of issued debt; the issuance tenor refers to the number of years debt is 
held for; and margin represents the amount of collateral the holder of debt is obligated to 
deposit with a counterparty to cover all or part of the credit risk exposure. Macroeconomic 
indicators include economic size and growth, which are depicted through GDP and GDP per 
Capita respectively; interest rates represent the resulting spread of lending rate minus LIBOR; 
inflation is proxied by inflation rate; finance debt represented through the ratio of central 
government debt to GDP; and cumulative finance debt as the total finance debt in the last 3 
years. Financial characteristics of financial development indicators encompass the Islamic 
banking system size as the ratio of Islamic financial assets to GDP; the financial market size as 
the percentage of financial system deposits to GDP; market capitalization of the stock market; 
regulation represented through the financial market development indicator score; institutional 
quality represented by the countries’ institutions indicator; institutional reserves depicted by 
months of imports; and the countries’ credit rating as provided by S&P credit rating agency. 
Finally, the events we are considering in this study can be categorized under previous Sukuk 
issuance, a dummy variable equal to 1 when the government has experienced Sukuk issuance in 
the past 3 years, and 0 otherwise; simultaneous issuance, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
government has issued both Sukuk and conventional bonds in the same year; and the event of 
sovereign default, another dummy variable that equals 1 if the government has experienced a 
sovereign defaults and 0 otherwise.   
Hypotheses Development:  
As a part of our effort in investigating the determinants or factors behind a 
government’s choice of a specific sovereign debt channel, we follow the conventional finance 
popular view of Grigorian (2003) that both external and internal factors matter in the choice of 
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debt. We hypothesize that analogous to firms seeking debt, a plethora of internal and external 
factors do affect governments’ choice of sovereign debt. Internal factors may come in the form 
of the country’s own financial characteristics as conveyed by its financial development 
indicators; its financial characteristics, or the specific events the country experiences, whether it 
is a previous sovereign default or a simultaneous issue of sovereign conventional and Sukuk for 
instance.  
Hypothesis 1: Both internal and external factors matter in a government’s choice of sovereign 
debt.  
According to Gelos et al. (2011), larger and richer countries are more likely to access 
credit markets. In line with this view, we conjecture that countries with developed credit 
markets, larger financial markets, larger size of finance debt, and higher country credit ratings, 
may have better incentives to develop their current credit markets by having access to newly-
developed credit instruments, i. e. sovereign Sukuk, thus are more likely to issue sovereign 
Sukuk rather than sovereign conventional bonds.    
Hypothesis 2: Larger and richer countries are more likely to issue sovereign Sukuk rather than 
sovereign conventional bonds.    
Following Presbitero et al. (2016), we believe that a handful of determinants interact 
together to influence a country’s choice of sovereign debt. We hypothesize that the choice of 
sovereign debt hinges on a plethora of factors, such as the level of a country’s economic 
development as shown by its economic indicators (economic size and growth) as well as its 
financial characteristics (level of finance debt, size of financial market, Islamic banking system 
size, quality of institutions and reserves, country credit rating, etc).  
Hypothesis 3: A government’s choice of a sovereign debt mechanism is influenced by financial 
development indicators, as well as macroeconomic indicators.  
 
Nagano (2017) argues that one of the necessary conditions in choosing Sukuk over 
conventional bond issuance is the ability to access Sukuk market, and that a low level of 
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financial constraints may lead to preferring the Sukuk market. We posit that countries that 
enjoy a larger Islamic finance system and favorable country credit ratings are more inclined 
towards issuing sovereign Sukuk. 
Hypothesis 4: Countries with larger Islamic finance systems and favorable country credit 
ratings are more likely to issue sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign conventional bonds. 
Godlewski et al. (2013) discuss that issuance of sukuk may transmit a signal to the 
general public. We conjecture that specific events at the level of the country may have an impact 
on the type of debt issuance as countries experience different circumstances.   
 
Hypothesis 5: Countries with simultaneous or previous issue are more likely to issue Sukuk 
rather than conventional bonds.   
The explanatory variables are defined in Table 3; they are captured by the latent utility 
shown in the following equation: 
yi*= α +β1Size + β2 Margin + β3 Tenor + β4 Financial Market Size + β5 Islamic Finance Size + β6 
Previous Sukuk Issuance + β7 Simultaneous Sukuk Issuance + β8 Country Credit Rating + β9 GDP+ 
β10 Inflation+ β11 Interest Rate + ε 
*When estimating the model, sovereign Sukuk (with Yi = 1) is used as the base case against 
which the sovereign bond (with Yi = 2) choices are compared. 
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Table 13: Correlation Matrix 
The correlation matrix shows a mix of positive and negative correlations between each debt securities ratio principles with a countries’ specific determinant variables and debt 
characteristics. We notice low correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables and we conclude that our analysis is indicative of the fact that multi-collinearity issue is not 
detrimental to the results of our regression analysis.  
 
 Size Margin Tenor Prev. Issue 
Simultaneous 
Issue 
Sovereign Regulation Inst. Q. Debt RATING IFSIZE FINMART 
Size 1.000            
Margin 0.2025* 1.000           
Tenor 0.1109* 0.1207* 1.000          
Prev. Issue 0.3154* -0.2438* 0.0207 1.000         
Simult. Issue 0.1455* -0.1836* -0.0939* 0.5426* 1.000        
Sovereign -0.4639* -0.0687 -0.1571* -0.4623* -0.2774* 1.000       
Regulation 0.2465* -0.3597* 0.0943* 0.7681* 0.3546* -0.2602* 1.000      
Inst. Qlty 0.1003* -0.4051* -0.0111 0.6554* 0.5330* -0.0594 0.8145* 1.000     
Debt 0.2788* 0.7046* -0.0184 0.1608* -0.1289* -0.3787* -0.0458 -0.2692* 1.000    
RATING 0.2503* -0.4520* 0.1819* 0.6674* 0.4408* -0.5941* 0.5818* 0.5673* -0.1036* 1.000   
IFSIZE 0.1091* -0.4370* -0.2195* 0.3051* 0.3477* -0.1074* 0.2306* 0.2871* -0.3650* 0.4035* 1.000  
FINMART 0.1101* -0.4365* 0.0272 0.5230* 0.1084* -0.0821* 0.7201* 0.3963* -0.1456* 0.3818* 0.2099* 1.000 
             
*** Significant at 1%,** significant at 5% and* significant at 10%. 
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A mix of positive and negative correlations between the variables in our main equation emerge 
from the correlation matrix in Table 13, and for the most part, we notice that the correlation 
coefficients among the independent variables are low, which indicates that the multi-
collinearity is not a detrimental issue to our regression analysis results.  
From the one hand, the correlation matrix shows a negative and significant correlation 
between an OIC country’s credit rating and margin (-0.4520), which justifies that countries with 
a low credit rating are less credible or less credit-worthy and are then required to present higher 
margins to cover up some or all of the potential credit risk exposure. From the other hand, a 
country’s debt and its financial market size are negatively and significantly correlated at the 
10% significance level (-0.1456), which indicates that countries with strong financial markets 
have lower levels of debt or rely less on debt markets to fulfill their financing needs. A country’s 
credit rating and its level of debt are negatively correlated (-0.1036), which indicates that an OIC 
country’s credit market accessibility hinges on their sovereign credit rating score and confirms 
the above finding. That is, the better the credit quality for a country, the less its reliance on debt 
channel although it has greater access to the credit market.  
The size of Islamic banking system for an OIC country is negatively correlated with its 
level of debt (-0.3650), which is indicative of the fact that countries with higher dependence on 
government debt financing are less likely to tap into Sukuk market and most likely prefer the 
regular conventional bond issuance instead. Moreover, an OIC country’s credit rating and its 
Islamic banking system size are significantly and positively correlated at the 10% significance 
level (0.4035). This indicates that OIC countries with relatively higher credit quality have a 
tendency to prefer issuing sovereign sukuk rather than conventional bonds. This strategy may 
be linked to those countries’ willingness to explore and take advantage of newly-developed 
credit tools as a part of developing and revolutionizing their own credit markets. 
Islamic finance size and margin are negatively correlated (-0.4370), that is, countries that 
rely on sovereign Sukuk as a major source of financing are required to hold lower margins as 
opposed to their counterparts relying on conventional sovereign bonds, a finding that was 
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conveyed in the initial descriptive statistics when we noted that on average, the margin of the 
sovereign bond is higher than what observed in sovereign Sukuk. 
Due to the positive correlation between Islamic banking size and the level of 
institutional quality within a country (0.2871), we can also conclude that countries with higher 
institutional quality scores are more likely to tap into sovereign Sukuk credit market. On a 
similar note, the negative correlation between the institutional quality and the level of debt (-
0.2692) reveals that countries that enjoy higher levels of institutional quality tend to rely less on 
debt markets, possibly preferring other channels of financing.  
Finally, the negative correlation between an OIC country regulation as proxied by the 
financial market development indicator score and its corresponding level of debt (-0.0458) 
uncovers that the more developed a financial market is, the less its dependence on debt as a 
financing medium. Moreover, highly regulated countries with elevated levels of financial 
market development indicators are more likely to tap into sovereign Sukuk markets rather than 
conventional bond markets, as depicted by the positive correlation between regulation and 
Islamic finance size (0.2306).    
 
4. Results and Main Findings 
This section displays and comments on the results of the study. We first present our 
main findings then display our robustness checks. 
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Table 14: Main Regression Results 
Table 14 reports our main estimations using the logit model. The determinants of the sovereign target debt security issuance reveal 
a mixed but significant relationship between a country’s economic and financial conditions, debt characteristics and special events 
that take place within the countries’ debt market. We observe that debt maturity, debt margin and issuance size have no 
explanatory power on determining sovereign Sukuk issuance. Results indicate that countries with previous Sukuk issuance within 
the last three years are more likely to issue Sukuk within the year, while the simultaneous issues of both Sukuk and bonds have no 
significant impact on sovereign Sukuk issuance. It remains unclear whether historical sovereign defaults reported in the history of 
participating OIC countries have any impact on the preference of sovereign Sukuk over conventional bonds. 
 
                                                                Islamic Sukuk     
              Coef Std. Err.             Z    P > lzl 
[95% 
Confidence    
Interval]  
         
Issue Size   -1.03e-09 2.40e-09 -0.43  0.667 -5.73e-09 3.67e-09 
Margin 1.349187 .9207603 1.47  0.143 -.4554699 3.153844 
Tenor -.1700677 .29070359 -0.59  0.559 -.7398361 .3997006 
Previous Issuance 10.3114 4.087588 2.52  0.012 2.299886     18.32294 
 
Simultaneous Issue  
1.881665 2.511921 0.75  0.454 -3.041609       6.80494 
Country Credit Rating -.3142197 1.567972 -0.20 
 0.841 -3.387388    2.758949 
 
Interest Rates   
3.617452 1.274166 2.84  0.005 1.120132     6.114773 
Financial Market Size .060743      .0603439 1.01 
 0.314 -.0575289    .179015 
 
Islamic Finance Size   
 
.439275 
 
.175194 
 
2.52 
 
 
0.012 
 
.0957558 
 
  .7680993 
Inflation Rate   -3.668906 1.535833        -2.39 
 
0.017 -6.679083  -.6587295 
GDP  1.00e-11 3.86e-11 2.59 
 
0.010 2.45e-11   -.6587295 
_cons  -43.21115 15.82947 -2.73 
 
0.006 -74.23635   -12.18595 
 
Table 14 reports our main estimations using the Logit model. The determinants of the 
sovereign target debt security issuance reveal a mixed but significant relationship between the 
choice of debt issuance and the different economic and financial conditions of a country, its debt 
characteristics and special events that take place within its debt market.    
 This table reports our main estimations using the Logit model. The determinants of the 
sovereign target debt security issuance reveal a mixed but significant relationship between the 
choice of debt issuance and the different economic and financial conditions of a country, its debt 
characteristics and special events that take place within its debt market. We observe that debt 
maturity, debt margin and issuance size have no explanatory power on determining sovereign 
Sukuk issuance.  
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In investigating the impact of specific events such as previous sovereign Sukuk issuance 
within the same year, simultaneous sovereign Sukuk and bonds issuance, or historical default, 
results indicate that countries with previous Sukuk issuance within the last three years are more 
likely to issue Sukuk within the year, while the simultaneous issues of both Sukuk and bonds 
have no significant impact on sovereign Sukuk issuance. It remains unclear whether historical 
sovereign defaults reported in the history of participating OIC countries have any impact on the 
preference of sovereign Sukuk over conventional bonds.      
As far as country credit rating is concerned, our results indicate that the OIC credit 
ratings have no statistical significance in the choice of sovereign Sukuk issuance.    
These results of a strong preference for issuing sovereign Sukuk rather than bonds when 
countries have a larger Islamic finance market provide evidence that characteristics such as 
more developed Islamic finance market lead to a higher preference towards issuing sovereign 
Sukuk rather than bonds as a means of developing current debt markets and diversifying debt 
products by selecting the relatively-new and sophisticated debt tool, the Sukuk. These findings 
partially confirm hypothesis 4.     
As far as interest rates are concerned, we conclude that they possess an explanatory 
power when it comes to deciding on the sovereign sukuk issuance, and the positive correlation 
between interest rates and the issue of Islamic Sukuk indicates that OIC countries with higher 
interest rate spread are more likely to issue sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign conventional 
bonds.    
Our results also show that on the financial market development side, the financial 
market size has no statistical power in determining sovereign Sukuk issuance, contrary to our 
finding that countries with larger Islamic finance size are more inclined towards sovereign 
Sukuk issuance as well.     
We also find that economic size, as represented by GDP, is positively correlated with 
sovereign Sukuk issuance. We conclude that countries with large economies prefer to issue 
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sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign bonds; confirming hypothesis 2, and since large 
economies have a strong potential to advance and develop their debt markets by venturing into 
new debt securities, Sukuk may be a perfect candidate for those sophisticated new debt 
products. Our finding is consistent with Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) and 
Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bk (2009) with regards to debt market development.      
4.1 Robustness Tests:  
Now for robustness check, we run the following logit regressions to control for the 
institutional effect, the debt effect and the institutional reserves effect, respectively. 
For the institutional effect, we posit that the issuance of Sukuk, yi, is determined by financial 
development indicators in the form of the country’s regulation and institutional quality, as 
proxied by the financial market development indicator score and the institutions indicator score 
respectively. The following Logit regression illustrates the model:  
yi*= α +β1Size + β2 Margin + β3 Tenor + β4 Regulation + β5 Institutional Quality + + β6 GDP+ β7 
GDP Per Capita + ε 
Table 15: Control of the Institutional Effect 
Table 15 results highlight the institutional effect in issuing Islamic Sukuk by indicating that the degree of regulation is a significant 
determinant of Sukuk issuance activity. While the institutional quality is found to have no explanatory power in the choice of 
sovereign Sukuk over sovereign bonds, the financial market development indicator is statistically significant and indicates that the 
degree of regulation is a significant determinant of Sukuk issuance activity. We conclude that OIC countries with higher financial 
market development scores are more likely to issue sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign conventional bonds.  
 
                                                                Islamic Sukuk     
              Coef Std. Err.             Z    P > lzl 
[95% 
Confidence          
Interval]  
         
Issue Size    1.44e-09 6.84e-10 2.10  0.036 9.49e-09  2.78e-09 
Margin -.1746252 .17308 -1.01  0.313 -.5138556 .1646053 
Tenor .0186007 .0457208 0.41  0.684 -.0710103 .1082118 
Regulation  3.955595 .9711849 4.07  0.000 2.052108 5.859082 
 
Institutional Quality  
.7479429 1.012503 0.74  0.460 -1.236527 2.732413 
GDP .7474537 .2963166 2.52 
 0.012 .1666838 1.328224 
 
GDP per Capita   
-.0000695 .0000217 -3.21  0.001        -.0001119 -.000027 
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_cons  -.41.24601 7.762038 -5.31 
 
0.000 -56.45933 -26.0327 
 
Table 15 results highlight the institutional effect in issuing Islamic Sukuk by indicating 
that the degree of regulation is a significant determinant of Sukuk issuance activity. While the 
institutional quality is found to have no explanatory power in the choice of sovereign Sukuk 
over sovereign bonds, the financial market development indicator is found to be statistically 
significant and indicative of the fact that the degree of regulation is a significant determinant of 
Sukuk issuance activity. We conclude that OIC countries with higher financial market 
development scores are more likely to issue sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign 
conventional bonds.  
To investigate the debt effect in influencing the issuance of Sukuk, we rely on the 
following regression model that highlights two macroeconomic indicators, finance debt and 
cumulative finance debt, as possible determinants of sovereign debt issuance yi. Finance debt is 
proxied by the percentage of the central government debt to GDP while the cumulative finance 
debt is represented through the total finance debt within a country in the last three years.  
yi*= α +β1Size + β2 Margin + β3 Tenor + β4 Finance Debt + β5 Cumulative Finance Debt + ε 
Table 16: Control of the Debt Effect 
Table 16 results reveal a colossal debt effect in determining the choice of sovereign debt as pronounced through the statistical 
significance of finance debt in issuing Sukuk. As the results indicate, OIC countries with higher levels of finance debt are more 
likely to prefer the issuance of sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign bonds; the cumulative finance debt does not seem to have a 
statistical significance in determing the sovereign debt choice.  
 
                                                                Islamic Sukuk     
              Coef Std. Err.             Z         P > lzl 
[95% 
Confidence             
Interval]  
         
Issue Size    -4.28e-11 7.26e-10 -0.06  0.953 -1.46e-09 1.38e-09 
Margin -.1272106 .2998211 -0.42  0.671 -.7148491 .4604278 
Tenor -.1335644 .059028 -2.26  0.024 -.2492571 -.0178717 
Cumulative Finance Debt 3.37e-11 3.55e-11 0.95  0.342 -3.58e-11 1.03e-10 
 
Finance Debt  
.0969591 .0349707 2.77  0.006 .0284177 .1655004 
_cons  -2.685425 1.890697 -1.42 
 
0.156 -6.391123 1.020273 
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Table 16 results reveal a colossal debt effect in determining the choice of sovereign debt 
as pronounced through the statistical significance of finance debt in issuing Sukuk. As the 
results indicate, OIC countries with higher levels of finance debt are more likely to prefer the 
issuance of sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign bonds; the cumulative finance debt does not 
seem to have a statistical significance in determining the sovereign debt choice.  
Finally, to investigate the institutional reserves effect, we run the following Logit 
regression model where the impacts of both finance debt and institutional reserves are 
accounted for: 
yi*= α +β1Size + β2 Margin + β3 Tenor + + β4 Institutional Reserves + β5 Finance Debt + ε 
Table 17: Control of the Institutional Reserves Effect 
Table 17 confirm the impact of finance debt in determining the sovereign choice of debt while indicating that institutional reserves 
have no statistical significance in determining the sovereign debt choice. 
 
                                                                Islamic Sukuk     
              Coef Std. Err.             Z    P > lzl 
[95% 
Confidence      
Interval]  
         
Issue Size    2.39e-09 5.42e-10 4.40  0.000 1.32e-09 3.45e-09 
Margin -.5398642 .1995887 -2.70  0.007 -.9310508    -.1486776 
Tenor .0547273 .0400852 1.37  0.172 -.0238383 .1332929 
Institutional Reserves  1.00e-11 3.09e-11 0.32  0.745 -5.06e-11    7.07e-11 
 
Finance Debt  
-.0252389 .0140618 0.073  0.073 -.0527995 .0023217 
_cons  .1807873 1.000025 0.857 
 
0.857 -1.779226 2.140801 
 
Results from Table 17 confirm the impact of finance debt in determining the sovereign 
choice of debt while indicating that institutional reserves have no statistical significance in 
determining the sovereign debt choice.  
5.  Conclusion       
Previous researches have paid little attention to understand the determinants of issuers’ 
choice between sovereign Sukuk and sovereign bonds. Therefore, this study tries to fill this gap 
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by analyzing the reasons why governments prefer to issue sovereign Sukuk rather than 
sovereign bonds. Our study focuses on 745 debts issued (143 sovereign Sukuk and 602 
sovereign bonds) by 16 Muslim countries, members of OIC, observed during the period from 
1995 to 2015. 
Our findings provide strong evidence that the determinants for government's choice to 
issue sovereign Sukuk or sovereign bonds are different. Countries with strong economic 
indicators, developed financial markets, strong Islamic finance markets are more likely to issue 
sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign bonds as a strategy to develop and diversify their 
financial markets by promoting new debt products. However, countries with weaker economies 
and frail financial positions are more likely to opt for sovereign bond issuance. Weaker 
economies may have neither the willingness nor the financial means to develop new debt 
instruments. Therefore, they choose the classic debt market.   
Our paper contributes to the existing economic and finance literature by providing 
evidence on the motives for national governments to issue sovereign Sukuk or conventional 
bonds. Moreover, we believe this is the first paper to examine the factors determining a 
government’s choice between sovereign Sukuk and conventional bonds in 16 OIC countries.  
As far as the direction for future research goes, with additional data becoming readily 
available in the future, we can further investigate the determinants of sovereign debt issue by 
examining the different structures of bonds and Sukuk, given the fact that there exist multiple 
types of Sukuk contracts (Ijarah, Musharakah, Murabahah, Istisna, Salam, Wakalah, and 
Mudarabah), and it may be very interesting to look at the possible determinants of issuing 
different types of Sukuk, and whether those determinants vary according to the type of Sukuk 
issued.  Moreover, it may be interesting to study the debt security choices across a multitude of 
different sectors. Finally, a further categorization may be considered as well; that is, looking at 
sovereign debt from two different perspectives, internal debt versus external debt.   
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